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ABSTRACT 
Essays on the Publicness of Education and the Effects  
of School Choice on Student Achievement 
 
Kerry A. King 
 
This dissertation is a collection of papers that focus on the effects of school choice in the 
education market.  The first chapter introduces the concept of school choice and discusses 
the arguments both for and against its implementation into public education. In addition, 
this chapter outlines the research agenda for this dissertation. Chapter 2 empirically 
measures the spillover benefits created by K-12 public education and finds that they are 
not Pareto-relevant at the margin. Given the results, this chapter also examines the role of 
school choice in the market for K-12 public education. Chapter 3 provides a brief history 
of school choice in the United States and discusses how it has developed and changed the 
education market over the past two decades. Chapter 4 empirically analyzes and 
compares for-profit and nonprofit charter schools and the effects each has on student 
achievement levels.  The results show that the structure of for-profit charter schools 
create incentives that contribute to higher student achievement levels when compared to 
their nonprofit counterparts. Chapter 5 analyzes how the implementation of a voucher 
program affects both urban and rural public school performance in the Cleveland, Ohio 
region.  Results indicate that competition for students has a positive impact on both urban 
and rural student achievement with greater effects being found in the urban areas as 
expected.  Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of the research chapters, presents the 
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The Publicness of Education, School Choice, and Student Achievement 
 
1.1 Introduction 
School choice is defined as a public school program that allows students to choose to 
attend any of various participating private and public schools.1  Over the past two 
decades, school choice has become a major topic in the realm of education reform.  In 
order to understand the importance of the school choice movement it is beneficial to look 
at why education policy has changed over the past several decades and how the need for 
reforms have led many to believe that parental choice is the only solution for improving 
the plight of K-12 public education in the United States.   
 Walberg and Bast (2003) point to three books that have substantially influenced 
the national debate on how best to organize K-12 schooling in the United States:  
Capitalism and Freedom (1962) by Milton Friedman; A Nation at Risk (1983) produced 
by the National Commission on Excellence in Education; and Politics, Markets and 
America’s Schools (1990) by John Chubb and Terry Moe.   
 Capitalism and Freedom (1962) is a book devoted to explaining the proper role of 
government in a free society.  One of the chapters titled, “The Role of Government in 
Education,” calls for a new approach to the financing of education where governments 
would give parents vouchers redeemable for a specified sum to use for the child’s 
educational expenses.  Parents would then be free to choose an “approved” institution to 
spend the sum of money for their child’s education.  In the book, Friedman also specified 
                                                 
1 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright © 2004, 2000 by 
Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. 
2 
that “the role of government would be limited to ensuring that the schools met certain 
minimum standards, such as the inclusion of a minimum common content in their 
programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to insure that they maintain minimum 
sanitary standards.”2 
 Even though at the time the above mentioned chapter in Capitalism and Freedom 
did not get much attention from a national audience, over the past decade as voucher 
programs have begun to take shape across the country, Friedman has been referenced as 
the first person to attempt to develop school choice as a possible solution to the problems 
facing K-12 public education.    
In 1983 after studying the American education system, The National Commission 
on Excellence in Education published an alarming federal report entitled A Nation at 
Risk: The Imperatives for Educational Reform.  The Commission found that “American 
students were not studying the right subjects, were not working hard enough, and were 
not learning enough.” This report also warned that “our social structure would crack, our 
culture erode, our economy totter, [and] our national defenses weaken” if the United 
States did not make immediate attempts to remedy the situation by finding a cure for our 
fatally-ill education system.3  The publication of A Nation at Risk made education reform 
a permanent issue on the national agenda and opened the door for school choice to once 
again become a relevant topic of debate among policymakers.   
In response to A Nation at Risk, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw an abundance 
of reforms take place as elected officials worked to improve the status of K-12 education.  
Popular reforms included increasing teacher salaries, reducing class size, changing 
                                                 
2 Friedman, Milton, 1962.  Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.   
3 National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983. A Nation at Risk: The Imperatives for 
Educational Reform Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.  
3 
student graduation requirements, encouraging greater parental involvement, targeting 
resources to students in poverty, changing curricula and teaching practices, and much 
more.4  Missing from these reforms were the ideas introduced by Friedman (1962) who 
believed that markets could more efficiently allocate educational resources than 
government-run schools.    
Chubb and Moe’s publication of Politics, Markets and America’s Schools in 1990 
finally forced policymakers to confront the fact that institutions and incentives matter 
because schools lack reasons and incentives to reform themselves.5  “Choice,” they 
wrote, “is a self-contained reform with its own rationale and justification.  It has the 
capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers 
have been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.”6  Chubb and Moe concentrate 
mainly on the issues of why government-run schools are doomed to fail because of 
political theories of institutional behavior.  They only downside to their book is the lack 
of any explanation from an economic viewpoint on how markets could be implemented 
to improve the situation.  This leads to the debate which is ongoing today on whether or 
not markets, and therefore competition through school choice, can improve the current 
educational situation.   
Opponents of school choice have voiced a variety of reasons why they think an 
economics based free market system in education is almost certain to fail.  One critic 
argues that school choice will cause the system to fail the children who are not lucky 
                                                 
4 Walberg, Herbert J., and Joseph L. Bast, 2003.  Education and Capitalism:  How Overcoming Our Fear 
of Markets and Economics Can Improve America’s Schools.  Hoover Institution Press Publication No. 521.   
5 Ibid. 
6 Chubb, John E., and Terry M. Moe, 1990.  Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools.  Washington, DC:  
The Brookings Institution.   
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enough to remove themselves from a low-performing school and will therefore “pit 
student against student and family against family in the struggle for educational survival” 
(Cookson, 1992).  Other critics see choice in American education as serving the interests 
of the already privileged and increasing the gaps between those who are already 
successful at manipulating the system and those who are not (for example, Moore and 
Davenport, 1990). They see choice as driving the privileged and less privileged further 
apart, exacerbating school inequalities. 
Another critique of school choice comes from those who worry about the 
potential loss of financial support for failing schools. If students move from a failing 
school in one district to a school in another district, the original district will lose valuable 
per-pupil funding. Essentially, they do not believe that allowing schools to fail will help 
the system overall.7 
Proponents of school choice contend that competition between schools will lead 
to increased school accountability which will encourage individual schools to experiment 
with different educational approaches in order to find those that work best for the 
students they serve (Raywid, 1992).  Other proponents such as Coulson (1996) argue that, 
“the education market rests on two main presumptions:  that monopoly control of 
education leads to coercion, indifference to the needs of families, and stagnation in the 
form and content of instruction, while competition and the profit motive would lead to 
greater quality and efficiency.”  Overall, most school choice advocates contend that 
giving parents educational options creates healthy competition among schools, providing 
schools with an incentive to improve. Based on the ideal of the free market, schools must 
meet the needs of their consumers (parents and students) in order to stay in business. 
                                                 
7 Education Weekly, 2005. Choice. [Online] Available at URL http://www.edweek.org.     
5 
Following this theory, if a school does not meet the needs of its students, parents and 
students should have the option of seeking better education opportunities elsewhere.8 
As a concept, school choice has existed in some form dating back to the early 
1800s.  In the past, only the wealthy families who could afford the tuition rates at private 
schools could exert choice over the school their child attended.  A truly free and 
competitive market in education can only exist when barriers to entry are eliminated.  
Therefore, in order to understand the effects of school choice on student achievement, the 
types of school choice that I will analyze are those which work to minimize these 
restrictions and allow parents to truly have a choice in what school their child attends.   
 
1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda 
There are four research chapters included in this dissertation that will present 
specific applications of the economics of school choice. A major criticism of school 
choice focuses on the idea that a free market education system would fail precisely 
because it would operate in the same way as other markets.  In other words, education 
would suffer due to the inherent market failure that exists in the form of positive 
externalities or spillover benefits.  This argument focuses on how an educated individual 
not only receives private benefits from being educated, but also indirectly benefits their 
fellow citizens as well.  If education does in fact suffer from this type of market failure 
there would be justification for government intervention and furthermore, competition 
would be an unlikely solution for improving educational outcomes.  Chapter 2 focuses on 
this argument and measures the publicness of education by estimating the spillover 
benefits created by K-12 public education.  The empirical results show that K-12 public 
                                                 
8 Ibid.  
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education does not suffer from a positive externality problem and therefore from an 
efficiency standpoint, school choice can work to improve educational outcomes by 
incorporating competition into the education market.   
Chapter 3 chronicles the development of four popular school choice options in the 
United States:  charter schools, vouchers, open enrollment, and tax credit and tax 
deduction programs.  Charter schools are publicly funded, privately run institutions that 
have recently become a key player in the school choice movement.  Since the first charter 
school opened in Minnesota in 1992, the number of charter schools has reached nearly 
3,000 and the number of students enrolled is approximately 700,000 for children in 
grades K-12.9  This chapter discusses how the idea of ‘chartering’ a school first began 
and also how it eventually evolved into one of the most popular forms of school choice in 
the United States today.  Next, this chapter discusses the origins of voucher programs and 
focuses on their development in the areas of Maine, Vermont, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Cleveland, Ohio, and the District of Columbia.    This chapter also discusses the legal 
battles voucher programs have faced and the current status of voucher legislation. Finally 
this chapter defines and explains the development of the school choice options of open 
enrollment and tax credit and tax deduction programs and gives a list of where these 
options can be found throughout the United States.     
 Chapters 4 and 5 present specific examples on how certain types of school choice 
options affect student achievement levels. Chapter 4 tests whether or not the profit motive 
in charter schools has an impact on student achievement. A study by Hoxby (2003) 
models the for-profit motive in education and finds that the distribution of the surplus is 
the key difference between for-profit and nonprofit schools.   For-profit schools can 
                                                 
9 The Center for Education Reform, 2005. [Online]  Available at URL http://www.edreform.com.  
7 
distribute surplus in the form of cash to its shareholders, while nonprofit schools 
distribute its surplus in other ways through equipment, books and supplies, etc.  The 
motivation to improve school quality is therefore greater in the for-profit schools and thus 
higher student achievement is the predicted result.  This chapter empirically tests 
Hoxby’s theory and is able to confirm that for-profit charter schools exhibit higher 
student achievement levels when compared to their nonprofit counterparts.  This implies 
that incentives do matter in education and therefore policymakers should focus on how 
competition and the profit motive can work together to improve the current state of K-12 
public education.  
Chapter 5 analyzes the effects of vouchers on public schools in the greater 
Cleveland area.  Vouchers, or scholarships as they are sometimes called, are payments 
made to parents, or institutions on a parent’s behalf, to be used for a child’s education 
expenses.  In Cleveland, only private schools are currently participating in the scholarship 
program and families must be below 200 percent of the poverty level to be eligible.  This 
paper focuses on four school districts in the Cleveland Metropolitan area. The school 
districts are separated into the categories of urban and rural based on population density.  
Each of the four districts are grouped with comparable schools across the state and the 
effects of the voucher program are empirically estimated using a standard educational 
production function and the value-added approach.  The results indicate that both urban 
and rural public schools in the voucher area are seeing higher levels of proficiency on 
average when compared to public schools outside the voucher region.  In addition, the 
urban public schools are seeing more of an impact than the rural regions which coincides 
with the goals of the voucher program.   
8 
 Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the major findings 
of each of the research chapters and highlighting the importance of each.  This chapter 
also provides some final thoughts on the policy implications of the dissertation and 












































In economics there is a well-established framework for determining whether government 
intervention into a market is justified.  If we look from the perspective of economic 
efficiency, government intervention has the potential to improve the market outcome 
when a market failure exists.  As Bator (1958) suggests, certain categories of market 
failures such as public goods, externalities, and monopoly all contain certain properties 
that lead to an allocation of resources which is not Pareto-efficient.  The use of the word 
potential is important to note when referring to government intervention and improved 
market outcomes because modern public choice theory also suggests the presence of 
government failures.  It is conceivable that even in a case where the private market fails 
to reach efficiency, government intervention might actually worsen, rather than improve, 
the situation. A possible explanation for this occurrence is given by Buchanan (1962) 
who discusses the concept of political externalities which refer to situations where 
political action is carried out without unanimous consent thereby reducing the choice set 
of agents. In addition, Sobel (2004) argues that in some cases it may be preferable to have 
an unregulated “bad” market outcome as opposed to the outcome that results with 
government intervention.10  
                                                 
10 For example, Husted and Kenny, (2000) find that government policies that equalize spending within a 
state make schools less efficient.  
10 
 One of the more interesting markets within which to apply these theories is K-12 
public education.  Even among economists, there remains debate over the extent to which 
this market is characterized by Pareto-relevant spillover effects or positive externality 
type problems.  Table 2.1 lists a variety of popular textbooks used to teach undergraduate 
public finance, and also demonstrates the various authors’ views on whether the spillover 
benefits created by K-12 public education are Pareto-relevant or Pareto-irrelevant. It is 
interesting to note that there is no clear consensus reached on how to treat the spillover 
effects that result from K-12 education.  Although the authors listed all agree that 
education does suffer from some form of externality problem, whether or not this 
problem impacts market efficiency is the focal point of the debate.  Anderson (2003) and 
Hyman (2002) define public goods as a special case of externalities and describe 
education as a ‘partially public good.’  According to this definition, the market fails due 
to the Pareto-relevant spillover benefits created by education thus justifying government 
intervention from an efficiency standpoint.  Fisher (1996) argues that government 
intervention is justified because education produces external benefits such as the gains to 
all from a literate society.   Rosen (2002) claims that education can give rise to a market 
failure due to the externality characteristics that it contains.  In particular, Rosen (2002) 
explains that even though most people consider public education to be primarily a private 
good, there are those who argue that it may also be the case that education gives rise to 
public goods.   Rosen argues that if education does contain public qualities then a 
possible explanation for government subsidization exists.  
Holcombe (1996) and Bruce (2001) enter the debate by using the term 
inframarginal to describe the type of externality created by education. With inframarginal 
11 
 
Table 2.1 Public Finance Approaches to Characterizing the Spillover Benefits 










Bruce (2001), Public Finance and the 
American Economy 
 X (inframarginal) 
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Stiglitz (2000), Economics of the Public 
Sector 
 X 
Ulbrich (2003), Public Finance In 
Theory and Practice 
X  
 
externalities, individuals are taking account of the full benefits or costs of their actions, at 
the margin. Inframarginal externalities do not necessarily imply an inefficient allocation 
of resources because even though there may be some spillovers of benefits or costs to 
others, there are no marginal benefits or costs.11  For example, suppose an industry 
pollutes a nearby lake which kills all of the fish and makes it unsuitable for swimming.  
Assume the industry were to reduce the amount of pollution it creates but even after 
doing so the fish are still unable to survive and swimming still is not safe.  In this case the 
                                                 
11 Holcombe, Randall G., 1996. Public Finance:  Government Revenues and Expenditures in the United 
States Economy.  West Publishing Company, 91-94. 
12 
externality is inframarginal because a marginal reduction in the amount of pollution does 
not make anyone better off and a marginal increase in the amount of pollution does not 
make anyone worse off.   
In the case of education, the question is whether or not the spillover benefits 
created by individuals who become educated are relevant at the margin.  If incentives 
exist so that individuals will receive enough of an education to be able to function in 
society, the positive externalities derived from an educated population are inframarginal 
and therefore do not constitute a reason for government intervention in the production of 
K-12 education. The marginal units of education do not confer the externality; it is the 
inframarginal units that individuals have the private incentive to obtain anyway.12 
Therefore, if the spillover benefits from K-12 education are inframarginal, the efficient 
amount of education can still be produced by market forces.  
In addition, although Stiglitz (2000) does not use the inframarginal argument 
directly, the author does maintain that for industrial cities such as the United States, 
government subsidies based on externality problems are unproved, implying that at the 
margin, the spillover benefits created by an educated population are not Pareto-relevant.  
Stiglitz (2000) does argue for government subsidies on distributional grounds supporting 
government financing as a justifiable type of government intervention in the education 
market.   Ulbrich (2003) explains that there are two possible justifications for government 
intervention in public education. First, from an efficiency standpoint the rationale is again 
the externality argument.  The second claim, similar to that of Stiglitz (2000), deals with 
equity and the idea that education is a merit good.  In this case, the role of government 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 
deals with the public financing aspect of government intervention, not the public 
production of education which this paper models.13   
Even more importantly, however, determining whether a market failure exists in 
the private production of K-12 education has important implications for public policy.  
While the production of K-12 education has been and continues to be dominated by the 
public sector, there has been significant support for introducing competition into K-12 
education by creating stronger market forces through vouchers, tax credit or tax 
deduction programs, school choice and charter schools.  There are currently 13 states 
which have adopted either a publicly funded voucher program, or implemented a tax 
credit or tax deduction program and 42 states that have charter school laws.14    The 
degree of potential market failure in K-12 education has significant implications for 
whether these increased privatization efforts have the potential to improve educational 
outcomes.  If the K-12 education market is subject to significant spillover effects or 
externality type problems, these efforts are likely to produce disappointing results.  On 
the other hand, if the K-12 education market is not subject to this type of market failure, 
there is clearly a justification for the use of market forces to improve educational 
outcomes.  In fact, if K-12 education is not subject to this problem, it eliminates the case 
for government production of education entirely from an efficiency standpoint, although 
arguments for public financing based on equity grounds could still be valid.   
                                                 
13 The public financing aspect of government intervention is analyzed by Toma (1996).  The author finds 
that the source of funding for education does not impact private school effectiveness.  The political 
restrictions placed on the decision-making of private schools are instead the important factors affecting 
efficiency.    
14 The following states have vouchers, tax credit, or tax deduction programs:  AZ, CO, District of 
Columbia, FL, IL, IA, ME, MN, OH, PA, PR, VT and WI. (Source:  Education Commission of the States, 
2005. {Online] Available at URL http://www.ecs.org). 
States without charter laws:  AL, KY, ME, MT, NE, ND, SD, VT and WV. (Source:  The Center For 
Education Reform, 2004.  [Online] Available at URL http://www.edreform).   
14 
 In this chapter, I present and estimate a model that produces a measure of the 
degree to which K-12 public education creates Pareto-relevant external benefits to the 
median voter.  Applying an empirical median voter demand curve model, I am able to 
obtain an estimate (on a scale of 0% to 100%) of the degree to which K-12 public 
education is really a pure private good producing no spillover effects.  My results suggest 
that K-12 education is almost entirely a pure private good, creating little to no external 
benefits to the median voter (above and beyond his or her own private benefit from K-12 
education). 
 The set up of this chapter is as follows.  Section 2.2 will discuss the benefits of K-
12 education and how spillover or external benefit arguments apply to this case.  Section 
2.3 will present the theoretical model from which the empirical model is developed.  
Section 2.4 will estimate the model using data from all 50 states including the District of 
Columbia for the 1979-80, 1989-90, and 1999-00 school years and Section 2.5 will 
present concluding thoughts and implications of this analysis. 
 
2.2 Benefits of Education 
When an individual becomes more educated, other people besides that individual are 
made better off as well.  For instance, if we suppose a certain individual goes to medical 
school and then one day uses her academic research to cure cancer, then this education 
will have made many people better off.  However, these spillover benefits only create 
problems for markets when a person is not compensated for the generation of these 
spillover benefits.  In competitive markets, labor earns its value of marginal product, and 
the individual mentioned above will be well compensated for inventing the cure for 
15 
cancer.  Thus, these types of spillover benefits that result from greater individual 
knowledge contributing to economic progress are fully internalized into one’s own 
individual demand curve for education.  At issue is whether education produces any 
spillover benefits that the individual does not fully internalize.  The most compelling 
argument is that as individuals become educated, others benefit from their ability to 
create a common cultural heritage and share a common language and numbering system 
which facilitates trade and human interaction on a broader social scale.  It can be argued 
that these types of benefits may not be fully internalized by the individual receiving the 
education.  Although individuals do have private incentives to get some basic form of 
education in order to function in society, the benefits that accrue to the population as a 
whole may not be fully internalized in their own private demand for education and 
therefore could be impacting market efficiency.  For the remainder of this paper I will use 
the term spillover benefits only when referring to these types of external benefits, 
excluding the positive benefits that accrue to others for which the individual is able to 
fully internalize the externality through her market earnings.   
 It is important for a moment to digress into a discussion of whether at the margin, 
these spillover benefits are a case of a relevant positive externality problem or an 
irrelevant positive externality problem.  Even if K-12 education creates a positive 
externality, this does not necessarily imply the presence of a market failure.  As 
mentioned previously, and by following Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), some 
externalities can be inframarginal, and thus not Pareto-relevant.15  This may be the case if 
the external benefits produced in the first few years of education are followed by 
                                                 
15 See the Appendix for a mathematical derivation of inframarginal externalities as shown in Buchanan and 
Stubblebine, 1962.  
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additional years of education which fail to produce additional external benefits.  As 
Holcombe (1996) argues, the external benefits accruing from the knowledge of a 
common language and numbering system are produced almost entirely in the first few 
early years of school.   
  In addition to the first few years of elementary education it can be argued that 
students also gain certain skills from the first few years of secondary education, which 
gives them the ability to create external social benefits that are not entirely compensated 
through market earnings.  For instance, everyone as a consumer is benefited by the 
presence of other informed consumers in the marketplace. In addition, everyone benefits 
from active and informed citizens participating in the political process, acting as 
watchdogs if nothing else.   
It is important to note that once an individual goes beyond these first few years of 
elementary and secondary education, additional years of education might create private 
benefits, but fail to produce additional, uncompensated, spillover benefits.  To better 
demonstrate this distinction, Figure 2.1 shows how the marginal social benefit curve of 
education might be constructed from the sum of the private (individual) demand for 
education and the marginal external benefit curve reflecting any spillover effects.  For 
simplicity of discussing the impact this has on optimal provision, a constant marginal cost 
curve is used to facilitate finding the socially optimal quantity in each case.  Three cases 
are illustrated in Figure 2.1.  Case (a) illustrates a situation in which every additional unit 
of education creates an external benefit.  In this case, the marginal social benefit curve 
appears to be shifted upward in a parallel fashion through the addition of the external 
benefits into the calculation.  This is the standard case shown to justify public subsidies to 
17 
 
Figure 2.1 Construction of the Marginal Social Benefit Curve 
 
                      
 













Note. DN' represents the marginal social benefit curve which is the sum of the private demand for education 
(D) and the marginal external benefits (EBN) reflecting any spillover effects.   
 
K-12 education.  The optimal provision (QN*) is at the intersection of MC and DN' which  
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begin to decline and eventually additional units do not generate additional spillover 
benefits.  Because D and DN' merge before the intersection with MC, the presence of 
these external benefits does not impact market efficiency.  On the marginal unit 
produced, the externality is not Pareto-relevant.  It is important to note that the position of 
the private demand curve for education, (D), plays a significant role in whether or not the 
spillover benefits impact market efficiency.  If the private demand curve was shifted far 
enough to the left, the spillover benefits would become relevant at the margin. This is 
also the case for the position of the marginal cost curve.  If the marginal cost of providing 
education was high enough, the spillover benefits would be Pareto-relevant.  Case (c) 
illustrates the final case in which there exists no external benefits at all, and the private 
and social benefit curves are identical (thus no market failure). 
 
2.3 The Median Voter Model 
In order to test for the presence of these Pareto-relevant external benefits shown in Figure 
1, Case (a), I employ a median voter demand curve model.  Originally developed by 
Bowen (1943), conceptually enriched by Downs (1957) and by Black (1958), this model 
is frequently used to measure empirically, the degree of publicness (versus pure 
privateness) for a good produced by the public sector.  A few such examples include 
Holcombe and Sobel (1995) who test the degree to which legislative activity is a public 
good, Deno and Mehay (1987) who use the median voter model to analyze the 
expenditure levels adopted by two forms of government, and Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972) who analyze the demand for various public 
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goods and services.  In addition, Langbein (2004) uses the median voter model to analyze 
whether a publicness element is present for public school music.   
The empirical validity of the median voter model has been tested by Holcombe 
(1980) in which the author uses data from millage issue elections in Michigan which 
determine the financing for public elementary and secondary education in this particular 
state.16  The results of this study show that the actual millage rate in the average school 
district is not significantly different from the median voter’s preferred rate and thus the 
median voter model provides a good empirical estimate of the Bowen equilibrium.   
Inman (1978) also provides empirical evidence that the median voter model is a good 
predictor of reality showing that a sample of Long Island schools created their budgets 
“as if the median income family were decisive.” 
The model employed here attempts to analyze whether a change in population 
results in a change in the quantity of the education provided.  The logic is that for a good 
that is joint-in-consumption, if another individual were to relocate into the community, 
they could share in the amount already being produced. Thus, the optimal quantity does 
not change with the size of the population.  The benefits from the production of the 
education can be extended to additional people at zero marginal cost.  Rather than 
estimating whether the coefficient on population is zero, however, this test takes into 
account that the tax cost per person is also reduced as more people consume the 
education already being produced, which should result in a higher quantity demanded and 
optimal level of provision.   
                                                 
16 The millage rate is the rate of taxation set by the governing authorities and the School Board to produce 
the necessary revenue to pay for the operation of local government and schools. A millage rate (or tax rate) 
is derived by dividing the county's operating budget by the total assessed value in the county. A millage 
rate of 25 mills, or $25.00 per thousand, means that the assessed value of the property is multiplied by 
$25.00 for each thousand dollars of the assessment. www.one-ifbyland.com/dictionary.htm 
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The publicness measure determines the degree to which the social benefit curve is 
the result of a vertical or horizontal summation of the individual demand curves.  Figure 
2.2 illustrates this point.  For goods that are joint-in-consumption (public goods) a 
vertical summation is necessary, while a horizontal summation is used for goods that are 
rival-in-consumption (private goods).  When goods are joint-in-consumption the social 
benefit for any given unit is the total benefit created across all individuals who share in 
the benefit.  When goods are rival-in-consumption, the social benefit for any given unit is 
simply the benefit to the single consumer who receives it.  As shown in Figure 2.2, the 
degree of publicness, α, is a measure of the angle which results from a vertical or 
horizontal summation of individual demand curves.  A smaller angle measure 
corresponds to a horizontal summation and thus reflects a more private good with little or 
no relevant spillover benefits and a larger angle corresponds to a vertical summation and 
a more public good with relevant spillover benefits.  For the case of K-12 education, a 
smaller angle measure would imply that at the margin, the spillover benefits do not 
significantly impact market efficiency in the production of education.   
More precisely to the model here, I am estimating whether a change in population 
results in a change in the demand curve of the median voter for K-12 education.  If the 
education of others creates spillover benefits for the median voter, his or her marginal 
benefit curve at every given quantity would shift upward as a larger proportion of the 
population becomes educated.  For example, if the median voter lived in a community 
with 9 other voters, the height of his or her marginal benefit (demand) curve would be 
equal to any private benefit received from education plus an additional amount added 
vertically nine times to reflect the additional spillover benefits.  If one more person were 
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to move into the community, it would result in an upward vertical shift in the median 
voter’s marginal benefit curve as the additional spillover benefits are generated.  Using  
 




Notes. Da, Db, and Dc represent individual demand curves which are summed vertically in the case of a 
public good and horizontally in the case of a private good.  The angle that results from either a horizontal or 
vertical summation of the individual demand curves measures the degree of publicness of education. This 
measure therefore provides evidence of whether or not the spillover benefits created by K-12 education are 
Pareto-relevant.   
 
Figure 2.1 we can replicate how the marginal social benefit curve of education is 
constructed from the sum of the individual private demand curve and the marginal 
external benefit curve to analyze what happens as population increases by one unit.   
Figure 2.3, Case (a) shows that as population increases from N to N+1 the additional 
external benefits created from each unit of education shifts the demand curve upward 
from DN' to DN+1'.  Case (b) represents the situation for which only the first few years of 
education create spillover effects that are not fully internalized and thus the demand 
curve shifts from DN' to DN+1', and as before has no impact on market efficiency given the  
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Figure 2.3 Construction of the Marginal Social Benefit Curve as Population 
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current location of the demand curve, D and the marginal cost curve MC.  Case (c) 
represents the situation with no spillover benefits and therefore the private demand curve 
equals the social demand curve at N and N+1.   
In order to utilize the median voter model we will assume that spending on public 
education is determined in a political framework in which voters have demands for the 
output derived from education.  Following the original analysis of public goods by 
Bowen (1943), it is assumed that public elementary and secondary education can be 
provided at a constant marginal cost.  The marginal cost is divided between the N 
individuals who reside in the community for which the school is located.  Each individual 
voter will assume that the costs to him or her are MC/N.  Each voter wants to equate the 
marginal benefits from an additional unit of output from public education to the tax price 
MC/N.  Following these assumptions, the majority voting rule implies that the median 
voter’s preferences prevail.  In addition, it is the case that successful candidates for 
government office, or more specifically in this case, candidates for the school board, will 
be those who propose platforms that bring the median voter’s marginal tax price in line 
with his or her marginal benefit.   
 Voters will decide how much education they desire by comparing the marginal 
benefits of education with their marginal tax prices.  If voters are well informed regarding 
the costs and benefits of local government services, individual preferences are single 
peaked and no strategic vote trading occurs.  The elected school board candidates will 
ensure that the marginal tax price charged the median voter equals the marginal benefit 
received from public education.  The quantity of education supplied will therefore be 
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equal to the quantity demanded by the median voter.17  Let the utility function of the 
median voter be given by,  
Ui = Ui (Xi, ei)     (2.1) 
 
    
where ei is the quantity of public education consumed by the median voter, and Xi is the 
quantity of other goods consumed.  Of the total amount of education supplied (E) the 
amount that is consumed by the median voter (ei) can be defined by the function, 
  
 
ei = N-αE     (2.2) 
 
        
where N is the number of people sharing public education.  Thus, the value α =1 implies  
 
that education is a purely private good, and α =0 implies that education is a pure public  
 
good.  Intermediate values of α imply quasi-publicness or quasi-privateness in  
 
consumption.   
 
 The median voter’s demand function for education is found by maximizing (2.1)  
 
subject to  
 
 Yi = Px Xi + TiPEE        (2.3) 
  
 
where Yi is the median voter’s disposable income, Px is the price of the other goods X, Ti  
 
is the voter’s tax share, and PE is the unit cost of providing education. 
 
 Substituting from equation (2.2), the budget constraint can be rewritten as 
 
 
Yi = Px Xi + TiPEeiNα     (2.4) 
 
 
which through optimization generates the demand equation 
                                                 
17 Deno and Mehay (1987) use this model to analyze expenditure levels across municipalities to determine 




ei = ei (Px, Ti, PE, N, Yi).   (2.5) 
 
  
For empirical purposes I assume that the unit cost of providing education and the price of 
other goods are the same across states.  In addition, we let the vector A represent 
differences in tastes across states while using a constant elasticity demand function to 
produce  
ei = A (TiNα )σ Yiλ.    (2.6) 
 
      












where θ = α (1+σ).  Taking logarithms, the median voter’s demand equation for E is 
 
 
ln E = ln A + σ ln Ti + θ ln N + λ ln Yi.  (2.9) 
  
 
The median voter’s disposable income Yi, is calculated as  
 
 
Yi = Yi* + TiG – F    (2.10) 
 
      
where Yi* is gross state median income, G is federal grants to the state in which the  
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median voter lives, and F is the voter’s federal tax liability which is calculated by 
multiplying the average federal tax rate by median income.18  The voter’s share of federal 
grants is represented by TiG and is calculated under the assumption that the voter’s 
benefit share is the same as the voter’s tax share.  Ti is calculated by multiplying the 
average tax rate on income and sales taxes by the median income to get the median state 
income and sales tax liability, and then dividing this number by total individual income 
and state general sales tax revenues.19  Because median  income is a before-tax measure, 
the median voter’s state and federal tax liabilities must be deducted from gross median 
income Yi* in order to obtain the correct measure of disposal income.20   
The shift parameter in equation (2.9), A, captures any fundamental differences in 
preferences across states.  The variables included to reflect voter preferences are 
population density (DEN), median age of the residents in the state (AGE), the percent of 
population non-white (NW), and the percent of the population under 18 (LESSTHAN18).   
The median voter’s demand equation for public education becomes, 
 
ln E = β1 + β2 ln TAXi + β3 ln POP + β4 ln INCOMEi + β5 ln DEN + β6 ln AGE + 
 
 β7 ln NW + β8 ln LESSTHAN18 +ε,                (2.11) 
 
where ε is the error term. 
                                                 
18 See Bradford and Oates (1971) for an analysis showing how lump-sum grants have the same impact on 
local public good demand as a grant given in proportion to an individual’s local tax share.   
19 An alternative calculation of Ti was also analyzed which included the effective property tax rate, based 
on the median value home for the year 2000 with no significant changes occurring in the resulting estimates 
of tax share liability.     
20 Many papers have followed this approach to calculating disposable income.  I continue to follow Deno 
and Mehay (1987) on this issue.   
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In the above model it was assumed that the unit cost of providing education was 
the same across states.  If we relax this assumption the following variables can be added 
to equation (2.11) to account for possible cost differences in the production of education 
in each state:  average teacher salary (SALARY), the total number of schools 
(SCHOOLS), and the percent of schools participating in the National School Lunch 
Program providing students with free or reduced price lunches (FREELUNCH).21  The 
median voter’s demand equation for public education including the cost variables 
becomes: 
 
ln E = β1 + β2 ln TAXi + β3 ln POP + β4 ln INCOMEi + β5 ln DEN + β6 ln AGE + 
 
β7 ln NW + β8 ln LESSTHAN18 + β9 ln SALARY + β10 ln SCHOOLS + 
 
β11 ln FREELUNCH +ε,                     (2.12) 
 
 




2.4 Empirical Results 
 
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) were estimated using state education data for all states 
including the District of Columbia for the 1979-80, 1989-90, and 1999-00 school years.22  
The measure of publicness, α, was calculated as α = θ/ (1+σ) = β3 / (1+β2) where β3 and 
β2 are the estimated elasticities of expenditures with respect to population and tax share, 
                                                 
21 Data on the percent of schools participating in the National School Lunch Program (NCLP) was not 
available for the 1979-80 school year and thus is only used in the 1999-00 and 1989-90 demand equations. 
Note that 1993-94 school year data is used for the 1989-90 estimates of percent of schools participating in 
the NCLP.    
22 Data sources are listed in the Appendix, Table A.1.  
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respectively. The results of equation (2.11) are reported in Table 2.2 and the results for 
equation (2.12) are found in Table 2.3.   
Table 2.2 reveals that for the 1999-00 school year, education was 97 percent 
private and thus only 3 percent public.23  An F-test was performed to determine whether 
α was significantly different from one by testing the linear restriction Hο: β2 - β3 = -1. The 
results indicate that the degree of publicness is in fact not significantly different than one 
and thus implies that K-12 education is almost entirely a private good with little or no 
spillover benefits.  The same analysis applies to the 1989-90 and 1979-80 school years 
with the results showing education to be approximately 99 and 97 percent private in each 
respective school year.  The degree of publicness from Table 2.2 implies that K-12 
education has been almost entirely a private good for the past three decades with the 
measure changing very little during this period.  This implies that more government 
intervention in terms of the public production of K-12 education based on an efficiency 
argument is unfounded given the current level of subsidization that already exists.     
Further inspection of Table 2.2 indicates that the tax share elasticity is negative in 
all three time periods and significant for the 1999-00 and 1989-90 school years.  
Consistent with previous studies, the estimates for population and income elasticity are 
positive and significant for all three school years.  The coefficients on population density 
are insignificant in every year which is a common finding in most empirical studies of 
this nature.24  The positive coefficient found on median age in all years is consistent with 
the life cycle hypothesis that says an older person will demand more public goods than a  
                                                 
23 To benefit the reader, the measure of publicness is shown in the tables in two ways.  Because α was 
found to be close to 1 implying a more private good, we call α the  “degree of privateness.”  The degree of 
publicness is thus expressed in both Tables 2.2 and 2.3 as 1-α.   
24 See Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Deno and Mehay (1987).  
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Table 2.2 Cross-section K-12 Public Expenditure Estimates Excluding Cost Variables 



































































Calculated Degree of 
Publicness    (1-α) 
 
0.0265 0.0044 0.0283 
Calculated Degree of 
Privateness   (α) 
 
0.9735 0.9956 0.9717 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9788 0.9818 0.9758 
F-statistic 330.79 386.47 289.40 
Observations 51 51 51 
Notes. For the coefficient estimates, standard errors are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate 
significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  The asterisks on calculated numbers represent the 
results from an F-test performed to determine whether α was significantly different than one and indicate 
significance as follows:  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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younger person with the same tax share and income.25   Percent of the population non-
white is found to be negative in all years and significant for 1989-90.  The coefficient on 
percent of the population less than 18 is found to be positive for all three school years and 
statistically significant for 1999-2000.   
Table 2.3 reports the results of equation (12) which takes into account possible 
cost differences across states.  The degree of publicness is again measured and the 
findings reveal that education was approximately 78 percent private in 1999-00, 80 
percent private in 1989-90 and 72 percent private in 1979-80. Although the degree of 
privateness falls in this specification, the percentages still imply that K-12 education is 
mostly a private good with few spillover benefits.  The results also indicate that the 
change in this measure over the past three decades is minimal which is consistent with 
the findings from equation (11) when costs are excluded.  In addition, the coefficients on 
population density (DEN), median age (AGE), percent non-white (NW), and percent 
under 18 (LESSTHAN18) are also all consistent with the results from equation (11).  The 
coefficients on teacher salary (SALARY) and the number of schools (SCHOOLS) are 
positive and statistically significant for all three school years while the cost variable 
measuring the percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch (FREELUNCH) is 
found to be insignificant in both the 1999-00 and 1989-90 regression equations.    
 
                                                 
25 See Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) for further analysis of this finding.   
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Table 2.3 Cross-section K-12 Public Expenditure Estimates Including Cost Variables 































































































Calculated Degree of 
Publicness  (1-α) 
0.2185 0.1954 0.2775 
Calculated Degree of 
Privateness (α) 
0.7815** 0.8046** 0.7225** 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.9881 0.9865 0.9806 
F-statistic 414.80 365.66 281.53 
Observations 51 51 51 
Notes. For the coefficient estimates, standard errors are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate significance as 
follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  The asterisks on calculated numbers represent the results from an F-test 
performed to determine whether α was significantly different than one and indicate significance as follows:  *** = 1%, 




Traditionally government has played a large role in providing elementary and secondary 
public education in the United States.  The results of this paper suggest that K-12 
education is entirely, or almost entirely, a private good with little or no significant 
external benefits given the current equilibrium conditions.  This finding substantially 
weakens the case for additional government involvement in the production of public 
education on efficiency grounds.26    
The results of this paper also provide a good foundation for the likely impact of 
privatization efforts in education.  The integration of school choice throughout the United 
States continues to grow through the creation of charter schools and the implementation 
of vouchers.  This paper shows that when we look at efficiency measures, market forces 
are capable of producing the efficient quantity of education given the current amount of 
subsidization already in place and thus privatization has the potential to increase the 
current quality of education through effective competition. Opponents of using stronger 
market forces in education through school choice may still cite equity as a major concern, 
but as Toma (2001) argues, the lack of competition in the education market hurts the 
students of poor families the most since they are the ones who are forced to attend the 
often poor performing schools in their local neighborhoods.   
Milton Friedman (1995) argues that substantial improvements in the current 
educational system will only occur if a significant fraction of our educational services are 
                                                 
26 One should keep in mind that the outcome of this model is conditional on the current equilibrium. As 
mentioned previously, the results rely upon the positioning of the original private demand curve and the 
marginal cost curve.  In addition, these results may not apply to many countries in the developing world.  
The external benefits created by educated individuals in developing countries may not fall to zero, implying 
that the spillover benefits could impact market efficiency.  In addition, publicly provided education may be 
the only feasible solution to educating people in the developing world where the means for privatization at 
this time are basically nonexistent.    
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rendered to individuals by private enterprise in order to provide effective competition for 
public schools.27  Perhaps this goal is somewhat daunting considering the large role 
government has played in the past providing education, but when one looks at the 
changes that have occurred because of school choice in the past few years, it is easy to 
see that competition has integrated itself into this market and has continued to be a source 
of controversy among policy makers.   
The results of this paper help to settle some of the debate on the extent to which 
education suffers from a market failure based on the positive externality or spillover 
argument.   At the margin, education does not produce additional Pareto-relevant 
spillover benefits and therefore, additional government intervention in the production of 
K-12 education cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.    With this in mind, it is 
important to note that the privatization of education, or the continued efforts of school 
choice, would not face efficiency issues given the current equilibrium situation.  One 
could also speculate that the current problems embedded within K-12 education are 
manifested by the presence of government failures which would be corrected for if 
privatization and further school choice options become more widely available.     
When the public sector produces K-12 education, a good that has been shown to 
more closely fit the definition of a private good, there is no reason to expect the public 
sector to outperform the private sector in this market.  Stronger market forces through 
school choice implements the much needed element of competition into the education 
market and thus brings with it all of the benefits that competition creates.  In this case, 
higher quality K-12 education for all students would result.     
                                                 
27 These ideas were printed in the Washington Post on February 19, 1995 and reprinted by the Cato 
Institute as Briefing Paper No. 23, June 23, 1995.   
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Chapter 3 
The History of School Choice in the United States 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The exact point in time from which to begin an analysis of the history of school choice in 
the United States varies with the definition one gives such an idea.  The notion of 
implementing choice and competition in education can be traced all the way back to 
Adam Smith.  The following is an excerpt from, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, 1776 (Book 5, Chapter 1, Article 2). 
The expense of the institutions for education and religions instruction, is likewise, no 
doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed 
by the general contribution of the whole society. This expense, however, might perhaps 
with equal propriety, and even with some advantage, be defrayed altogether by those who 
receive the immediate benefit of such education and instruction, or by the voluntary 
contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other.  
 
Smith continues to point out in this chapter that the incentives of Professor’s who receive 
money from a general fund rather than on a per student basis will lack motivation and 
incentive.  Allowing students to choose the Professors under which to study creates an 
atmosphere where the Professor must compete for students by creating a reputation for 
providing high quality instruction.  This idea of empowering students (or parents) to have 
a choice in the type of education that they receive creates an education market where 
competition can thrive.  Consequently, this is the same motivation that has spurred the 
school choice movement in the United States over the past decade.   
In 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in Education published an 
alarming federal report entitled A Nation at Risk: The Imperatives for Educational 
Reform.  After studying the American education system, the Commission found that 
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American students were not performing at an acceptable level. This report also warned 
that if the United States did not make immediate attempts to remedy the situation by 
finding a solution to this problem, society would face dire consequences.28  The 
publication of A Nation at Risk made education reform a permanent issue on the national 
agenda and opened the door for school choice to become one of the possible solutions to 
the problems facing our failing school systems.   
 
3.2 Charter Schools 
Charter schools are a form of school choice which has grown in popularity since the first 
charter school legislation was enacted in 1991.  The first charter school opened in 
Minnesota in 1992, and since then, the number of charter schools has climbed to nearly 
3,000 and the number of students enrolled has reached close to 700,000 for children in 
grades K-12.29   
The charter school movement began from a variety of other reform ideas such as 
alternative schools, magnet schools, privatization, and parental empowerment.  The term 
“charter” may have originated in the 1970s when New England educator Ray Budde 
suggested that small groups of teachers be given contracts or "charters" by their local 
school boards to explore innovative approaches to education.30  Philadelphia started a 
number of schools in the late 1980s which were mostly schools of choice.  Minnesota 
was the next place this idea began to take shape where charter schools were developed 
                                                 
28 National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983. A Nation at Risk: The Imperatives for 
Educational Reform Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.  
29 The Center for Education Reform, 2005. [Online] Available at URL http://www.edreform.com.   
30 WestEd, 1997. About the Charter School Movement, History [Online]. Available at URL 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/history.htm. 
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based on three values:  opportunity, choice, and responsibility for results.31  It is from 
here in the early nineties that the charter school movement truly began.     
USCharterSchools.org is an online resource dedicated to providing information 
for those interested in learning more about the charter school movement.  This site 
defines charter schools as follows: 
A charter school is a nonsectarian public school of choice that operates with freedom 
from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools. The "charter" 
establishing each such school is a performance contract detailing the school's mission, 
program, goals, students served, methods of assessment, and ways to measure success. 
The length of time for which charters are granted varies, but most are granted for 3-5 
years. At the end of the term, the entity granting the charter may renew the school's 
contract. Charter schools are accountable to their sponsor-usually a state or local school 
board-to produce positive academic results and adhere to the charter contract. The basic 
concept of charter schools is that they exercise increased autonomy in return for this 
accountability. They are accountable for both academic results and fiscal practices to 
several groups: the sponsor that grants them, the parents who choose them, and the public 
that funds them.32 
 
Charter school laws vary from state to state but typically cover some basic legal 
areas.33  First, all states contain regulations on who may propose a charter, how charters 
are granted, and the number of charter schools allowed.  In addition, states identify how 
the school is legally defined and the levels and types of finance that will be provided for 
operation.   Rules regarding admissions and staff rights and privileges can also be found 
in state laws.  Finally all states address the degree of control a charter school has over the 
development of its instructional goals and practices and the types of assessments that 
each charter school will face in regards to renewal of the contract.34   
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 The Center for Education Reform has developed a ranking of charter state laws according to a list of 
criteria such as the number of schools allowed, fiscal autonomy, automatic waiver from state and district 
laws, etc.  The ranking gives a grade of A-F and ranks state laws as strong to medium if they receive a 
grade of A or B, and weak if they receive a grade of C, D or F.  States with strong to medium strength laws 
are as follows:  AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, IN, MA, MI, MN, MO, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, TX, 
Washington, DC, WI.  States with weak laws are as follows:  AK, AR, CT, GA, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, LA, 
MD, MS, NV, NH, OK, RI, SC, TN, UT, VA, WY. 
34 Ibid.  
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Charter schools are not allowed to charge tuition and they are funded according to 
enrollment. In some states, such as Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, and New Jersey, they 
receive less than 100% of the funds allocated to the traditional public schools. In other 
states, like California, additional funds or loans are made available to them.35 In most 
states, charters do not receive capital funds for facilities but federal legislation provides 
grants to help charters with start-up costs. They are also entitled to federal categorical 
funding for which their students are eligible, such as Title I and Special Education 
monies. 
As of 2005, 41 states, including the District of Columbia, have passed charter 
school laws.36 The states are listed in Table 3.1 which includes the year the charter law 
was passed, the year the law was amended, the current number of schools, and the 
number of students enrolled. 
 
3.3 Vouchers 
The next form of school choice that I will discuss is probably the most controversial of 
four types mentioned in this chapter.  This school choice option allows the use of public 
money to attend private nonparochial and parochial schools through the use of a voucher.  
Milton Friedman is most commonly cited as the first person to develop the idea of 
educational vouchers.37  Friedman (1963) stated that “governments could require a 
minimum level of schooling financed by giving parents vouchers redeemable for a 
specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’ educational services.”
                                                 
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid.  
37 As I will mention later on, Vermont and Maine have been implementing a voucher type program since 
the late 1800s.   
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Table 3.1 Charter School Numbers by State as of January 2005 
State Year Law Passed Year Law Amended Schools Operating Enrollment 
Alaska 1995 2001  20 2,682 
Arizona 1994 2001  491 73,542 
Arkansas 1995 2003  11 1,486 
California 1992 No amendments  500 153,935 
Colorado 1993 2003  93 25,512 
Connecticut 1996 2001  16 2,526 
Delaware 1995 2001  13 5,262 
Florida 1996 2002  258 53,350 
Georgia 1993 No amendments  36 15,117 
Hawaii 1994 2002  26 3,301 
Idaho 1998 2002  13 2,694 
Illinois 1996 2003  30 10,309 
Indiana 2001 2001  17 1,275 
Iowa 2002 2003  0 0 
Kansas 1994 2003  31 2,568 
Louisiana 1995 No amendments  16 4,631 
Maryland 2003 2000  0 0 
Massachusetts 1993 No amendments  50 14,013 
Michigan 1993 2001  210 60,236 
Minnesota 1991 No amendments  95 12,269 
Mississippi 1997 No amendments  1 334 
Missouri 1998 2000 27 12,130 
Nevada 1997 2003  14 2,851 
New Hampshire 1995 2001  0 0 
New Jersey 1996 2001  52 18,081 
New Mexico 1993 No amendments  37 4,234 
New York 1998 No amendments  51 10,954 
North Carolina 1996 No amendments  94 21,030 
Ohio 1997 2001  142 28,446 
Oklahoma 1999 2003  12 2,197 
Oregon 1999 2002  43 2,107 
Pennsylvania 1997 2001  103 33,656 
Rhode Island 1995 2002  8 914 
South Carolina 1996 1998  19 1,235 
Tennessee 2002 No amendments  4 0 
Texas 1995 2002  241 74,129 
Utah 1998 No amendments  19 1,259 
Virginia 1998 2001  9 1,440 
Washington, DC 1996 2002  43 11,530 
Wisconsin 1993 No amendments  147 26,797 
Wyoming 1995 2002  1 110 
Source: The Center For Education Reform, 2005, http://www.edreform.com.   
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Friedman wanted to limit the government’s role in education to making sure that schools 
met minimum educational standards.  In his view, an educational market would be much 
more efficient at allocating educational resources than a system of schools run by the 
government.  
Initially, Friedman’s ideas did not get much public support but in the 1960’s 
President Johnson’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) developed a voucher 
proposal which was embraced by President Richard Nixon's administration. There was so 
little enthusiasm for the idea, however, that Minneapolis, Rochester, Kansas City, 
Milwaukee, Gary, and Seattle all rejected the opportunity to participate in an 
experimental program.38 The only community that agreed to try the OEO plan was Alum 
Rock, California, where it was implemented within the public school system with 
disappointing results and subsequently abandoned.39 
In 1971, the Panel on Non-Public Education of the Nixon administration's 
Presidential Commission on School Finance wanted to develop a plan for the public 
funding of religious schools. The plan was referred to as “Parochiaid” and faced the 
possibility of being deemed unconstitutional as well as widespread public opposition.  
The Supreme Court in its 8-0 ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971 held that to be 
constitutional the plan had to meet three standards: its purpose is not secular; its main 
effect is to neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it does not excessively entangle the 
state with religion.40  
                                                 
38 Molnar, Alex, 2001. “School Vouchers: The Law, the Research, and Public Policy Implications.”  
39 Ibid. 
40 Thomas W. Lyons, 1970. "Parochiaid? Yes!" Educational Leadership, November 1971, pp. 102-104, and 
Glenn L. Archer, "Parochiaid? No!" Educational Leadership, November 1971, pp. 105-107. See also, 
Grace Graham, "Can the Public School Survive Another Ten Years?" Educational Leadership, pp. 800-
803.  
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The Reagan administration tried repeatedly in 1983, 1985, and 1986 to get some 
form of voucher legislation passed but was unsuccessful in all attempts.  In the late 
1980's and early 1990's, supporters of private school voucher plans made an important 
breakthrough by effectively blurring the distinction between public school choice and 
private school voucher plans in the public debate. 41 This eventually led to where we 
stand today with a few pilot voucher programs underway.  
Currently there are two types of vouchers operating in the United States:  publicly 
funded and privately funded. As defined by the Education Commission of the States 
(ECS), a publicly funded voucher is a payment made to a parent, or to an institution on 
the parent’s behalf, to be used for a child’s education expenses.  For example, vouchers 
have been used in the District of Columbia and Florida to help the plight of low 
performing schools, in Cleveland, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin to aid low income 
families, and in Maine and Vermont to provide students without a school in their town an 
opportunity to be educated elsewhere.   
A privately funded voucher is a payment that a private organization makes to a 
parent, or an institution on a parent’s behalf, to be used for a child’s education 
expenses.42  Although not as common as the publicly funded voucher, two of the more 
notable privately funded efforts are the Children First America (CFA) and the Children's 
Scholarship Fund (CSF).  In 1994, CFA was established with the purpose of establishing 
privately funded vouchers across the United States.  Currently CFA is affiliated with over 
100 privately funded voucher systems in 39 states including the District of Columbia.  In 
1998, the Children's Scholarship Fund (CSF) was developed by New York City investor 
                                                 
41 Molnar, Alex, 2001. “School Vouchers: The Law, the Research, and Public Policy Implications.”  
42 Education Commission of the States, 2005. [Online] Available at URL http://www.ecs.org.   
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Theodore J. Forstmann and Wal-Mart heir John Walton by pledging $100 million dollars 
to help low-income parents send their children to private and parochial schools.43 In April 
1999, CSF announced that 1,237,360 children applied for partial scholarships, which 
amounts to about one out of every 50 schoolchildren in the country.44 As of June 2002, 
CSF was giving scholarships to nearly 34,000 children across the country.45 
 Most people are not aware that a type of voucher program has been in existence 
for over a century.  In Maine since 1869 and in Vermont since 1873, vouchers have been 
in use through “town tuitioning” programs, which serve students living in rural and non-
urban areas in these two states. This voucher-like system was created to serve the needs 
of local families who resided in districts where elementary and secondary schools were 
nonexistent.  Funds were, and still are, provided by the student’s home district to send the 
child to any public or non-sectarian private school anywhere within and even outside the 
state.   
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is probably the most studied 
public voucher program in the United States. It was sponsored in 1990 by African-
American State Representative Polly Williams in response to high drop-out rates, 
disgraceful test scores and an unacceptable disparity in educational opportunity between 
Milwaukee's low-income and middle-income families.   
MCPC provides an opportunity for students under specific circumstances to 
attend at no charge, private sectarian and nonsectarian schools located in the city of 
                                                 
43 Ibid.  
44 Anemona Hartocollis, 1999. “Private School Choice Plan Draws a Million Aid-Seekers,” The New York 
Times, (21 April 1999),  A1, A25. 
45 Children’s Scholarship Fund, About CSF: Facts, 2005. [Online] Available at URL 
http://www.scholarshipfund.org/about/facts.asp.  
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Milwaukee.46  Students in the program must come from households with income 1.75 
times the poverty line or less and may not have been in private schools or in school 
districts other than the Milwaukee Public School (MPS) District in the prior year.47 At 
first, eligible schools had to be private, nonsectarian schools with no religious affiliation 
or training. In 1995, to meet high demand, Wisconsin approved the inclusion of religious 
schools in the Milwaukee Choice Program but due to a legal challenge, religious schools 
were not allowed to participate until 1998.48  Participating private schools receive the 
Milwaukee Public School per-member state-aid in place of tuition for students in the 
program.   
In addition, schools cannot discriminate in selection based on race, religion, 
gender, prior achievement, or prior behavioral records and if classes are oversubscribed, 
selection is on a random basis. Schools must meet at least one standard established for 
attendance, parental involvement, student achievement on standardized tests, or grade 
progress. The total number of students in the Choice Program in any year is limited to 1.5 
percent of the students in the Milwaukee Public Schools.49   
Research on choice students and families indicates that choice is targeted toward 
poor families attempting to find an alternative to what they view as a poor educational 
environment for their children. The choice students come from poor, mostly single-parent 
households and like Milwaukee Public School (MPS) parents, approximately 60 percent 
are receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children or public assistance. The parents 
                                                 
46 The Data and Program Library Service (DPLS) is the central repository of data collections used by the 
social science research community at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and provides information about 






also are found to be dissatisfied with prior public schools, and, based on prior test scores, 
there is clear evidence that their children were not doing well in those schools. 
According to DPLS, despite being poor, however, the choice families are smaller 
than those in the comparison groups, thus providing an opportunity for parents to focus 
more on any single child. The parents (especially mothers) have been found to be more 
educated, more likely to work at home with their children on education problems, and 
were more likely to participate in their children's prior schools at higher rates than the 
average parent. Table 3.2 lists the number of students participating in the program from 
its infancy through the 2003-04 school year. 
In addition to the MPCP, the Cleveland Scholarship program was the first 
publicly funded American voucher program to include both parochial and secular 
schools.  On June 30, 1995, then-Governor and former Cleveland Mayor George 
Voinovich signed a state budget bill that included a pilot voucher program for Cleveland 
students.  Beginning in the 1996-97 school year, the state provided vouchers worth up to 
$2,250 to 1,994 low-income students in grades K-3 to attend the public or private school 
of their choice.  The voucher program went through some legal turmoil when the 
constitutionality of including religious schools was brought into question. After being 
deemed unconstitutional in December of 2000 proponents sought to get the decision 
overturned by The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  In March 2001, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals declined to review the lower panel's ruling. In June 2002, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris upheld the Cleveland Scholarship and 
Tutoring Program, ruling that the use of public money to underwrite tuition at private and 
religious schools does not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution as long as 
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Table 3.2 Voucher Program Student Enrollment 
 Milwaukee Cleveland Florida McKay Florida OSP 
1990-91 341    
1991-92 521    
1992-93 608    
1993-94 733    
1994-95 802    
1995-96 1,454    
1996-97 1,657 1,994   
1997-98 1,545 2,914   
1998-99 6,085 3,674   
1999-00 8,007 3,406 Pilot Year 57 
2000-01 9,619 3,797 977 41 
2001-02 10,882 4,523 5,017 46 
2002-03 11,670 5,281 9,105 555 
2003-04 13,268 5,887 12,456 633 
Source:  Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, the Ohio Department of Education’s Office of 
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, and the Florida Department of Education.   
 
 
parents make the decision regarding where the voucher is used. Today, the Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program provides tuition vouchers to parents who send their 
children to a public or private, religious or nonreligious school of their choice and allows 
public school parents to purchase tutoring services for their children.  Students must 
reside in Cleveland and be in grades K-3 to enter the program but eligibility remains 
through grade 10.  The voucher is based on a percentage of the tuition, 90-75 percent 
based on income level, or $3,000, whichever is lower and parents must pay the 
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difference.  Students are accepted on a random basis with siblings of current participants 
given priority.50 Table 2 lists the number of students participating in the program from its 
beginning in 1996 through the 2003-04 school year. 
Florida has three main programs that allow students to attend private or religious 
schools with taxpayer dollars. The pilot year for the McKay Scholarships was 1999 
which allows students with disabilities to receive a McKay voucher after being in public 
school for a year. McKay vouchers can be worth more than $20,000, depending on the 
severity of the student's disability.51  
The Opportunity Scholarship, also starting in 1999, allows students in public 
schools that receive an F grade twice in four years to receive a voucher to attend a private 
or public school. This scholarship is a part of Governor Jeb Bush's A+ plan for education 
and combines the use of vouchers with high-stakes testing.  Students enrolled in grades 3-
10 take the state’s accountability test, the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test 
(FCAT). Students must pass the reading portion of the FCAT in order to be promoted to 
the 4th grade and must pass the 10th grade test in order to graduate. The results of the test 
are also used to grade schools on a scale from A to F and as mentioned above, if a school 
receives an F twice in any four-year period, it is considered chronically failing and its 
students become eligible to receive vouchers they can use at other public schools or at 
private schools. Going into the 2002-03 administration of the FCAT, 129 schools had 
received at least one F and ten schools have had their students become eligible for 
                                                 
50 Facts and figures were taken from the following source: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/Schools/ohio.cfm.   
51 The Palm Beach Post, 2003.  [Online] Available at URL http://www.palmbeachpost.com.  
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vouchers since school grading based on the FCAT began in the 1998-99 school year.52 
Opportunity Scholarships are currently being challenged in court because of their use of 
tax dollars at religious schools.53 Table 2 lists the number of students participating in the 
McKay and Opportunity Scholarship program from its beginning in 1999 through the 
2003-04 school year. 
The Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship is the third type of program in which 
students who receive free or reduced-price lunches are eligible for vouchers worth $3,500 
each. Private companies can donate up to a total of $88 million dollars to the program 
and receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit. The vouchers are awarded through private 
Scholarship Funding Organizations that collect the donations and issue the vouchers to 
students. There are currently about 10,420 students in Florida using tax credit vouchers.54 
On January 22, 2004, Congress passed a federally funded school voucher 
program, allocating $14 million dollars to establish a program for low-income students in 
the District of Columbia.55 The funding is part of the Fiscal 2004 Omnibus Spending bill 
that passed the Senate by a vote of 65 to 28 and was subsequently signed by the 
president. Under this program, for five years beginning with the 2004-05 school year, 
federal taxpayers will subsidize the tuition of low-income students in the District of 
Columbia who can gain admittance to religious and other private schools, up to a 
maximum of $7,500 per year per student.56  The voucher program is being run by the 
                                                 
52 Greene, Jay P. and Marcus A. Winters, 2003. Education Working Paper 2, [Online] Available at URL 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org.  
53 The Florida Supreme Court will listen to oral arguments on June 7, 2005.   
54 The Palm Beach Post, [Online] Available at URL http://www.palmbeachpost.com.  
55 People for the American Way Foundation, [Online] Available at URL http://www.pfaw.org.  Eligible 
students are those whose families earn up to 185 percent of the poverty level. 
56 Ibid.  
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U.S. Department of Education, along with the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and 
administered by a private organization called the Washington Scholarship Fund.57 
Many critics of the D.C. voucher law have voiced their concerns about how it has 
been implemented.  For instance, even though the voucher program was meant to allow 
low-income students in failing public schools to leave those schools and attend higher- 
performing schools, there is no criteria that gives the private schools participating any 
rules to follow in order to demonstrate that they are higher performing.  In addition, the 
law does not prohibit private schools from imposing admissions tests or other admissions 
requirements on voucher students, or from charging them tuition in excess of the 
maximum voucher amount if their tuition rates are higher.   
 While it is still too early to evaluate how the program is working in terms of 
student outcomes, one problem area has already came into view.  Although the voucher 
law gives the greatest priority to students attending D.C. public schools most in need of 
improvement as defined by federal law, research shows that fewer than 75 of the more 
than 1,300 students who received vouchers came from those public schools. At the same 
time, more than 200 students already enrolled in private schools, almost three times that 
number, have received vouchers.58  Future research on this program should focus on how 
to best reach those students who would benefit the most from switching schools. 
 
3.4 Open Enrollment  
Even though some voucher programs managed to take shape and are still fighting their 
way through legislation today, the Reagan administration, meeting with opposition to the 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
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free market ideas that private vouchers created, had decided to move on to the concept of 
public school choice in order to gain support.  Many saw this new idea for public school 
choice as a strategy to reform rather than dismantle the entire educational system.  In 
1988 Minnesota enacted a public school choice law and over the next eight years, 13 
other states followed suit with laws allowing students to attend any public school in the 
state that had room for them.59  This type of school choice is known as open enrollment 
and became even more important when The Education Reform Act of 1993 required that 
districts vote yearly on whether to accept choice students.  Open enrollment laws are 
defined in the following way:  “intradistrict” open enrollment laws allow choice of public 
schools within district boundaries, “interdistrict” open enrollment laws allow choice of 
public schools across district boundaries, “mandatory” open enrollment laws require 
districts to allow students to transfer to the school of their choice and "voluntary" open 
enrollment laws allow districts to choose whether to allow students to transfer to the 
school of their choice. State aid normally follows the students to the new school districts, 
and parents generally are responsible for transporting their children to the boundaries of 
the new school districts. However, in some states, low-income families receive some 
transportation support. Table 3.3 lists the status of the open enrollment laws in the United 
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Alaska   X  
Arkansas     
Arizona X  X  
Alabama     
California  X X  
Colorado X X X  
Connecticut X X  X 
Delaware X  X  
District of 
Columbia     
Florida  X X  
Georgia X X X  
Hawaii    X 
Idaho  X  X 
Illinois   X  
Indiana  X X  
Iowa X    
Kansas  X   
Kentucky X  X  
Louisiana X X X  
Maine  X   
Maryland     
Massachusetts  X X  
Michigan  X   
Minnesota X    
Mississippi  X   
Missouri X X   
Montana X X   
Nebraska X    
Nevada  X   
New Hampshire  X  X 
New Jersey  X   
New Mexico  X  X 
New York  X   
North Carolina     
North Dakota  X   
Ohio  X X  
Oklahoma X  X  
Oregon  X   
Pennsylvania  X   
Rhode Island  X   
South Carolina  X   
South Dakota X  X  
Tennessee  X X X 
Texas  X X X 
Utah X  X  
Vermont  X   
Virginia     
Washington X  X  
West Virginia  X X X 
Wisconsin X X X  
Wyoming  X   
Source:  Education Commission of the States, 2005. [Online] Available at URL http://www.ecs.org.  
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3.5 Tax Credit and Tax Deduction Programs 
The final type of school choice that I will discuss is tax credit and tax deduction 
programs.  Table 3.4 lists the seven states that currently offer these options and the year 
in which the program was enacted.   
 
Table 3.4 Tax Credit and Deduction Programs 
 







                             Source:  http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.  
 
Educational tax credits are a direct reduction in tax liability for educational 
expenditures such as tutoring, books, computers, and, in some states, private school 
tuition.61 For example, if an individual owes $1,000 in income taxes, she is eligible for a 
given state’s $500 tax credit. This person would then subtract the $500 tax credit from the 
$1,000 tax liability, and then owe $500 in income taxes.62  State legislation determines 
the amount of credit and which educational expenses qualify. In some states, families 
                                                 
60 Minnesota’s income tax features both an education tax credit and a deduction program. The deduction 
has been in effect since 1955 and allows parents earning more than $37,500 to subtract from their taxable 
income up to $1,625 per qualifying child in grades K-6, and $2,500 for a qualifying child in grades 7-12. 
The education tax credit, which first took effect in 1998, is available to families earning less than $37,500 
and is worth up to $1,000 per child and $2,000 per family. The credit is limited to 75 percent of the 
taxpayer’s qualifying expenses. This means that for each dollar spent on a qualifying educational expense 
for a qualifying child, taxpayers receive 75 cents as a tax credit on their income tax return. While the 
deduction lowers taxable income, the education credit reduces state income tax liability or increases a 
taxpayer’s refund.  Source: School Choice Info, 2002. [Online] Available at URL 
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.  
61 School Choice Info, 2002. [Online] Available at URL http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.  
62 Education Commission of the States, 2005.  [Online] Available at URL http://www.ecs.org.  
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with no tax liability may receive a refund for part of, or the entire amount spent on 
qualifying educational expenses.   
Educational tax deductions allow for certain educational expenses to be deducted 
from taxable income prior to the calculation of tax liability.63 A tax deduction offsets a 
portion of the cost of qualifying educational expenses, depending on the percentage tax 
bracket an individual is in. For instance, suppose an individual has a taxable income of 
$100,000. She, however, is eligible for a given state’s $1,500 tax deduction. She subtracts 
the $1,500 from her income of $100,000, and now has $98,500 in taxable income.64 
Families with no tax liability will receive no benefits from this type of program. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Although private schools have always been an option for parents when it comes to 
choosing a school for their children, it was intentionally left out of this discussion.  The 
school choice options that I focus on are the ones available to all families regardless of 
ability to pay.  In the past, it was only wealthy families who could afford to send their 
children to private schools, thus traditionally having more educational options, but over 
the past two decades, school choice proponents have worked to break through these 
barriers.    
Currently school choice is probably the most referenced idea when education 
reform is the topic of debate.  The speed with which school choice has evolved over the 
past couple of decades may be too slow for some who feel that competition is the only 
means for improving our current system.  However, one can definitely see that a school 
                                                 
63 School Choice Info, 2002. Online] Available at URL http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.  
64 Education Commission of the States, 2005.  [Online] Available at URL http://www.ecs.org.  
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choice movement has taken shape and its future will most likely depend on how fast we 
can learn from past mistakes and continue to develop successes.   
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Chapter 4 




School choice as a method for improving educational outcomes has become an 
increasingly important topic among policy makers over the last decade.  One existing 
hypothesis states that school choice creates an atmosphere of competition for students 
that will spur public schools to higher achievement.   A study by Teske, Schneider, 
Buckley, and Clark (2000) shows that school managers respond to competition from 
other schools by trying harder to enhance school efficiency and by adopting more 
innovations at their school in direct proportion to the competitive enrollment pressure that 
they feel.   
Charter schools as a type of school choice have been growing in popularity over 
the past several years.  The effects of charter schools on traditional public schools have 
been widely studied and much of the evidence points to gains in productivity in public 
schools that are created by the competition that school choice generates.  Hoxby (2003) 
found that Arizona public schools raised their productivity in response to competition 
from charter schools by 0.55 (national percentile points per thousand dollars spent) based 
on the fourth-grade reading exam, by 0.70 based on the fourth-grade mathematics exam, 
by 0.38 based on the seventh-grade reading exam, and by 0.53 based on the seventh-
grade mathematics exam. In another study, Holmes, Desimone, and Rupp (2003) found 
an approximate one percent increase in achievement when traditional schools in North 
Carolina faced competition from a charter school.  
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The literature has also focused on comparing charter students to traditional public 
school students to determine the impact of the resulting competition on student 
achievement levels.  The first randomization-based study by Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) 
looks at a large system of charter schools in Chicago. They find that enrolling in charter 
schools by grade five raises achievement levels by about six percentiles.  Another study 
by Hoxby (2004) compares charter students in the United States to their fellow students 
in neighboring public schools and finds that overall charter students are 3.2 percent more 
likely to be proficient in mathematics and 5.2 percent more likely to be proficient in 
reading.  When looking at individual states, Hoxby (2004) finds that in Arizona, fourth 
grade charter students are about 10 percent more likely to be proficient in reading and 
math than students in the matched traditional public schools. Hoxby (2004) also finds that 
in California, the proficiency advantages are 9 percent in reading and 5 percent in math, 
and in Colorado, the proficiency advantages are 12 percent in reading and 14 percent in 
math. North Carolina was the only state in which charter students’ proficiency is 
statistically significantly lower, by 4 percent, in both reading and math, compared to 
students in the nearest public school. In addition, Texas’ charter students appear to be 
statistically significantly less proficient in math (not reading). (Hoxby 2004)   
Although the amount of evidence indicating the positive benefits from charter 
schools has recently been growing, the literature has neglected to analyze whether the 
effect differs between for-profit and nonprofit charter schools.  In this paper I explore 
whether the for-profit motive in education produces even greater benefits in Arizona’s 
for-profit charter schools than in the nonprofit charter schools with which they compete.65  
                                                 
65 It should be noted that both for-profit and nonprofit charter schools in Arizona generally locate in larger 
cities so that any endogeneity in the choice of location is not an issue for the comparison used in this study.   
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Although there are many states that have both for-profit and nonprofit charter schools in 
operation, at the time this paper was written, Arizona was the only state for which a 
sufficient amount of for-profit student achievement data was available for a concrete 
analysis.66    My results indicate that average student test scores at various elementary 
grade levels in the for-profit charter schools were between 1.65 and 6.15 percentile points 
higher in the 2002-03 school year and between 2.65 and 6.47 percentile points higher 
during the 2003-04 school year when compared to nonprofit charter schools in the same 
state.   
The set up of this chapter is as follows.  Section 4.2 defines how charter schools 
operate and discusses the current empirical findings related to competition and student 
achievement. Section 4.3 presents the theoretical model for measuring student outcomes 
from which the empirical model is developed.  Section 4.4 describes the data used in this 
analysis.  Section 4.5 presents the empirical model and Section 4.6 describes the results. 
Section 4.7 presents concluding remarks and implications of this analysis.   
 
4.2 Charter Schools and Competition  
Charter schools are defined by the U.S. Department of Education as independent public 
schools designed and operated by educators, parents, community leaders, and other 
educational entrepreneurs. Each charter school has a governing board and a sponsoring 
entity which monitors the quality and effectiveness of the school.  Charter schools can be 
organized as either nonprofit corporations or as for-profit corporations and must comply 
                                                 
66 The charter school laws of at least 12 states (AZ, CA, CO, CT, IL, KS, LA, MA, MI, MN, NJ, and NC) 
allow for-profit companies to operate publicly funded charter schools. In several of these states, charters 
have become the point of entry for school management companies. AZ, MA, and MI are the leaders in for-
profit charter school management. [Online] Available at URL Source: www.corpwatch.com.  
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with everything in its charter contract with the state as well as all applicable federal and 
local laws and regulations.  These schools also develop their own policies related to 
discipline, personnel, attendance, and curriculum which can help to remove the 
inefficiencies often created by the bureaucracy inherent in traditional public schools.          
 The goals of many typical charter schools can be summarized as follows: (1) 
continue to improve student learning, (2) encourage the use of different and innovative 
teaching models, (3) create new professional opportunities for educators to design and 
implement learning programs, (4) increase choice of learning opportunities for students, 
(5) establish new models of public schools and a new form of accountability, and (6) 
provide for greater parent involvement.67  
 Charter schools like traditional public schools are state-funded, however, charter 
schools receive fees on a per student basis.  Although all charter schools must implement 
open enrollment, some target toward specific student populations such as teen mothers, 
students with disabilities, students interested in the arts, or students who do not perform 
well in a formal school setting.   
There are approximately 3,400 charter schools operating in the United States, an 
estimated 50 percent increase since the year 2000.  In Arizona there are currently 491 
charter schools in operation serving 73,542 students.68  Arizona passed its charter school 
law in 1994 and charter schools began operating during the 1995-96 school year.  Table 
4.1 displays the progression of charter schools in Arizona over the past 9 years.  The data 
shows that charter school enrollment saw a 42 percent increase from the 1997-98 to 
                                                 
67 These goals were taken from the following website: 
http://www.usoe.k12.ut.us/charterschools/legislation.htm.  
68 Arizona has the second largest number of charter schools and students in the United States.  California 
has the largest with 500 charter schools in operation serving 153,195 students.   
Source:   The Center for Education Reform, 2005.  [Online] Available at URL http://www.edreform.com.   
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1998-99 school year and a 14 percent increase from the 2001-02 to 2002-03 school year.  
A small decrease is seen from 2002-03 to 2003-04 which is most likely due to the 
consequence of having a cap on the number of charter schools chartered each year. 
 



















Schools 51 133 163 252 322 339 391 446 491 
Students 7,350 16,650 25,500 36,250 46,350 55,586 65,769 75,135 73,542 
Sources: Glass, 2004, 1995-96 to 1999-2000 (Nunez, D.R., 2001). Counting Students in Arizona Charter 
Schools. Dissertation, Arizona State University); 2000-01 to 2002-03 (Arizona Department of Education, 
Research and Policy Section); 2003-04 (The Center for Education Reform). 
 
 
4.3 The For-Profit and Nonprofit Models 
The educational production function has been used extensively in the literature to look at 
both the level of and growth in student achievement.  In addition, value-added measures 
have arguably become the most common way to deal with the limitations of the education 
production function when analyzing school quality.69   A school’s value added can be 
defined as the amount of student learning during the year that is attributable to the school.  
The value-added approach focuses on the gains in student achievement rather than simply 
the levels of student performance. The advantage of this approach is that it eliminates 
potential bias that may result from prior unobservable family and school inputs. In this 
paper, I use the educational production function while implementing the value-added 
                                                 
69 For a few examples see Hanushek and Kain (2005), Meyer (1997), and Summers and Wolfe (1997).  
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approach by using the previous year’s test score as a control variable to compare student 
achievement levels in for-profit and nonprofit charter schools.  In particular I analyze the 
characteristics of for-profit and nonprofit charter schools and the incentives faced by their 
administrators.  The production function is as follows, 
Yt = f (Yt-1, X, NS, e)             (4.1) 
where Yt measures student performance based on standardized test scores in year t; Yt-1 
represents lagged test scores; X represents school inputs such as teachers, school 
administration, transportation and facilities; NS represents non-school factors such as 
student motivation and innate ability, family characteristics, neighborhood characteristics 
and peer effects; e represents the random error; and f(·) represents the production process. 
By analyzing student achievement levels in both for-profit and nonprofit charter 
schools, this paper tests whether the incentives of administrators in a for-profit charter 
school have a positive impact on charter school quality. Because charter schools are 
financed primarily by the state based on enrollment, the incentives of the school 
administrators are first to keep enrollment high, and second to continue to attract new 
students.  This assertion is the principal idea behind why school choice creates 
competition for students.  Because administrators want larger budgets and because 
budgets increase with enrollment, schools engage in active competition for students.   In 
order to maximize student enrollment, charter school administrators must attract parents 
away from traditional public schools.  Hoxby (1999) suggests that parents prefer schools 
with better academic achievement records, although other characteristics may influence 
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this decision as well.  For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that parents enroll their 
child in the school with the best achievement levels as signified by high test scores.   
The most important difference between for-profit and nonprofit charter schools is 
contained in the question of what it is that the producers of education maximize.  I use a 
model developed by Hoxby (2003), which compares the incentives faced by for-profit 
and nonprofit charter schools.  When examining the for-profit model, it is assumed that 
the charter school could charge a fee that was set by law and could not be topped up by 
parents.  In addition, the school is also required to accept students by a random process 
such as a lottery.  The school would solve a maximization problem as follows, 
Maxq,s,z  π = fx(q) – c(q, s, w, z, p) x(q).                         (4.2)        
The idea is that a school maximizes the difference between revenues and costs.   Its 
revenues are composed of the fixed fee, f, times student enrollment, x. The school’s costs, 
c, are the per-pupil cost times the number of students enrolled.  The school chooses the 
quality q to offer based on the labor it hires, s, and the other inputs it employs, z.  The 
wage rate for staff is w, and the price for inputs is p. The per-pupil costs are increasing in 
quality, staff hired, and other inputs, but they are independent of enrollment.   
 Since parents choose the school that offers the highest school quality in terms of 
performance levels, enrollment is increasing in quality.  Schools must compete for 
students by means of quality of education, and the schools that offer the highest quality 
will enroll all of the public school students in that area up to their capacity.  Lower 
quality schools will be driven out of the market.  Therefore enrollment is given by, 
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1 if q j* > qj≠j* for all j,    (4.3) 
        
                                    x (qj*) = 0 if q j* < qj≠j* for any j.70         (4.4) 
Therefore, a school must maximize its performance level otherwise a higher quality 
school will attract away its’ students.  The school earns just enough profit to pay its 
shareholders a market rate of return for the use of their capital, so the goal is to maximize 
the number of students on which it earns a small profit. As Hoxby (2003) shows, if 
economies of scale exist, managers of for-profit firms may be able to earn economic 
profits in local markets where they compete with other schools by pooling together in 
buying inputs, curricular research and development, and information processing.  
 Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) find that another key difference between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations is the distribution of surplus.  A nonprofit school cannot 
directly distribute surplus to any one particular group or person.  The surplus can be 
distributed in ways that create a better work environment such as more supplies, catered 
meetings, new computers, and so on.  These types of distributions are almost always 
wasteful in the sense that distributing cash (as for-profit schools do) rather than goods 
and services creates a much higher incentive structure for staff members.  The 
distribution of goods and services are rarely concentrated to one single person or a 
specific group of staff members, therefore the school decision makers face weaker 
incentives to expand enrollment in order to increase the surplus and hence faces weaker 
                                                 
70 See Hoxby (2003) for further details.   
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incentives to keep the school at a high performing level.  The nonprofit charter school’s 
maximization problem incorporates the distribution of surplus and is as follows, 
       Maxq,s,z  (φ · π) /s = φ · [fx(q) – c(q, s, w, z, p)x(q)]/s       (4.5) 
 where enrollment is given by,  




1 if q j* > qj≠j*  for all j,    (4.6) 
                              x(qj*) = 0 if q j* < qj≠j* for any j.71     (4.7) 
The maximization problem suggests that a staff member wants the school to maximize 
the surplus π which is multiplied by φ and then divided by the number of staff members, 
s.  φ is a factor less than one which gives the share of surplus that remains after it has 
been transformed into goods for the staff.  As before, the revenues are composed of the 
fixed fee, f, times student enrollment, x and the school’s costs, c, are the per-pupil cost 
times the number of students enrolled.  The school chooses the quality q to offer based on 
the labor it hires, s, and the other inputs it employs, z.  The wage rate for staff is w, and 
the price for inputs is p. This maximization problem implies that nonprofit schools face 
weaker incentives than for-profit schools to expand enrollment implying that a positive 
correlation between for-profit charter schools and student achievement could exist. 
4.4 Data 
I use scores from two standardized tests to measure student performance in Arizona’s 
charter schools, both of which were collected from the Arizona Department of Education. 
                                                 
71 See Hoxby (2003) for further details.   
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The first measure of student performance in Arizona’s charter schools comes from a 
nationally standardized norm-referenced achievement testing program in the subjects of 
reading, language, and mathematics given to students in grades two through nine.  This 
test, known as the Stanford 9, uses the percentile rank to compare each student's 
performance on the test to the performance of a representative sample of public school 
students of the same age and grade.  The percentile rank, reported in units that range from 
1 through 99, is the most common and readily understood score for interpreting student 
achievement. This ranking describes performance in small precise units relative to a norm 
group. For example, a percentile rank score of 68 means that the student earned a raw 
score that was higher than 68 percent of the students in the norm group who were in the 
same grade and took the same test.  
The second measure of student performance is a standards-based test called 
Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) which provides information 
regarding the progress of students toward mastering Arizona’s reading, mathematics and 
writing standards.  The AIMS test is given to students in grades three, five, eight, ten, 
eleven, and twelve and is similar to the Stanford 9 in that it uses percentile ranking, 
however, AIMS scores are grouped into four performance standard categories as well:  
falls far below the standard, approaches the standard, meets the standard, and exceeds the 
standard. 72     This study uses data from both the 2002-03 and the 2003-04 school years 
and concentrates on grades three and five.   
                                                 
72 Unlike traditional scores where student achievement is presented only in terms of numeric scores, 
performance standards are descriptors that provide concrete and meaningful information about student 
performance.  These standards were created by a committee of experienced educators, experts in the fields 
of reading, writing and mathematics. Source: Arizona Department of Education, [Online] Available at URL 
http://www.ade.state.az.us/.  
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In determining the control variables, I rely heavily on those variables proposed in 
the literature.  A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the effects of 
teacher characteristics on student learning such as teachers’ educational background, 
years of experience, and salaries.  Although Hanushek (1986) has found that teaching 
experience and graduate education do not contribute to student achievement, these factors 
are still commonly used in the literature as inputs in the education production function.73 
Other commonly used variables included to capture demographic characteristics of 
students are minority status and per capita income.    The teacher characteristics, minority 
status, and legal entity of the charter school were collected individually from each 
school’s annual report card available from the Arizona Department of Education.  Per 
capita income, a proxy for family background, was collected from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.74   
 
4.5 Empirical Model 
In both the for-profit and nonprofit charter models, school administrators seek to 
maximize the school’s profits and do so by increasing student enrollment.  According to 
the theoretical model, for-profit charter school administrators face greater incentives to 
attract new high quality students when compared to the nonprofit administrators. This 
implies that staff members will be more motivated to implement new innovations for 
learning, and will also be more likely to create an environment of high school quality that 
                                                 
73 For a few examples see Hanushek and Kain (2005), Darling-Hammond (2000), Krueger (1999), 
Summers and Wolfe (1977).  
74 Per capita income in 2001 was used for school year 2001-02 and per capita income in 2002 was used for 
school years 2002-04.   
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attracts parents and thus students.  This idea can be tested empirically by using a standard 
education production function as follows, 
 
Scoret = α + βScoret-1 + δInputst + θForProfit + λIncomet + µPercentMinority + et   (4.8) 
 
where Scoret equals the achievement level obtained by a particular school in year t, 
Scoret-1 is that school’s achievement level in the prior year, Inputst is a vector of 
measurable school inputs, which includes teacher education levels and years of 
experience in each charter school in year t.75  ForProfit represents the legal entity of the 
charter school and is included as a dummy variable equaling one if the school is for-profit 
and zero otherwise.  Income equals the income per capita for the county in which the 
charter school is located and is used as a proxy for current family characteristics and 
PercentMinority represents the percentage of minority students in each charter school in 
year t.  Left out of the equation are the unmeasured student characteristics such as innate 
ability and motivation.   
Because the focus of this paper is to test whether being a for-profit charter school 
has an impact on student achievement levels, the most important aspect of the above 
model is the ForProfit parameter estimate.  The results of the regression analysis, which 
involves testing the null hypothesis H0: θ=0 against the alternative hypothesis H1: θ≠0, is 




                                                 
75 In addition to the above equation, the change in scores, that is, Scoret - Scoret-1 was also used as a 
dependent variable for both exams.  The results are very similar to those found from using equation 4.8 and 





4.6 Estimation Results 
  
The education production function was estimated using least squares regression analysis 
and a value-added approach.76 Table 4.2 highlights the results reporting the ForProfit 
estimates using data from the Stanford 9 proficiency exam in the 2002-03 and 2003-04  
 
Table 4.2 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement Using a For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Comparison, Dependent Variable:  Average Test Score on the Stanford 9 
Exam 
 
 2002-03 2003-04 






























Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate significance as follows:  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, 
* = 10%. 
 
                                                 
76 In addition to running ordinary least squares, a basic model of spatial correlation developed by Cliff and 
Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988) was used to test for either spatial dependence in the dependent variable, or 
spatial dependence in the error component.  The estimated spatial autoregressive coefficient and the spatial 
error correlation coefficient were neither significantly different than zero implying that the model does not 
have a spatial dependence problem.   
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school years for grades two, three, four, and five.77  The three subjects tested, reading, 
mathematics, and language, were pooled for each grade level in order to gain a sufficient 
amount of for-profit observations.  For the 2002-03 school year, the coefficient of 
interest, ForProfit, was found to be positive and significant for grades three and five, and 
insignificant for grades two and four.  In addition, when all of the grade levels were 
pooled, ForProfit was found to be positive and significant at the five percent level.  The 
results from the pooled regression indicate that students in the for-profit charter schools 
on average scored 1.65 percentile points higher than the nonprofit charter schools with 
which they were compared.  A similar finding is found for the 2003-04 school year with 
the coefficient of ForProfit being positive in all grades and significant for grades three 
and four. When the grades are pooled in the 2003-04 school year the coefficient for 
ForProfit is again found to be positive and significant indicating that students in the for-
profit charter schools on average scored 3.15 percentile points higher than their nonprofit 
counterparts.       
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 highlight the results reporting the ForProfit estimates using data from 
the Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) exam. The three subjects tested, 
mathematics, reading, and writing are pooled for the school years 2002-03 and 2003-04.78   
In Table 4.3, students in grade three are ranked according to those who meet or exceed 
                                                 
77 Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix report the results of all coefficient estimates using the Stanford 9 
exam.  Note that PercentMinority is positive and significant in all equations contrary to previous research.  
This positive sign is most likely due to the large number of Native Americans in Arizona which are 
included as minority students in this analysis.  The coefficients included to account for teacher 
characteristics vary extensively in sign and significance which is consistent with previous research. Income 
per capita is found to be insignificant in all but one equation.   
78 Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix report the results of all coefficient estimates using the AIMS exam.  
Note here that PercentMinority is negative and significant in most equations while the variables used to 
represent teacher characteristics are mostly insignificant.  Income per capita is again insignificant in most 
cases.   
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the standard set by the state of Arizona.  The results indicate that in the 2002-03 school 
year, students in the for-profit charter schools who exceeded the standard were on 
average scoring 4.91 percentile points higher than students in the nonprofit charter 
schools.  In addition, when grouping meet and exceed the standard together, students in 
the for-profit charter schools who met and exceeded the standard were on average scoring  
3.15 percentile points higher than students in the nonprofit charter schools.   
Similar results are reported in Table 4.4 for students in the fifth grade.  The results 
indicate that in the 2002-03 school year, students in the for-profit charter schools who 
met the standard were on average scoring 6.15 percentile points higher than students in 
the nonprofit charter schools.  In addition, when grouping meet and exceed the standard 
together,  students in the for-profit charter schools who met and exceeded the standard 
were on average scoring 5.53 percentile points higher than students in the nonprofit 
charter schools. 
 
Table 4.3 Estimated Determinants of Student  Achievement Using a For-
Profit and Nonprofit Comparison, Dependent Variable:  Average 3rd Grade Test 
Score on Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards Exam 
 

























Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate significance as follows:  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, 
* = 10%. 
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Table 4.4 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement Using a For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Comparison, Dependent Variable:  Average 5th Grade Test Score on 
Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards Exam 
 

























Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, 
* = 10%. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The idea behind implementing school choice is to use market forces to direct labor and 
capital to their most productive functions.  Without the benefit of the profit motive, 
however, nonprofit charter schools fail to fully address the inefficiencies of public 
education.  The model developed by Hoxby (2003), discussed earlier in this paper, 
showed that for-profit charter schools face greater incentives to expand student 
enrollment when compared to nonprofit charter schools.  In order to expand enrollment, 
for-profit charter schools must be able to attract parents by keeping their current student 
test scores at a high level. Therefore, Hoxby’s model predicts that for-profit charter 
schools will see higher student achievement levels when compared to their nonprofit 
counterparts.  According to my results, for-profit charter schools are achieving higher test 
scores confirming what Hoxby predicted. My findings clearly indicate that nonprofit 
charter schools exhibit less motivation to expand or improve their services when 
compared to for-profit charter schools.    
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 Research has shown that the public education sector has performed very poorly 
when compared to economic sectors in which the profit motive is present such as the 
health care and information technology fields.  Until recently, the general absence of the 
profit motive has discouraged possible entrepreneurs from investing financial resources 
into schooling.  School choice has now allowed for-profit entities to enter the education 
sector, encouraging the competition this market has been lacking. Based on the results 
from the Stanford 9 and AIMS exams, the impacts of the profit motive on student 
achievement levels in charter schools are indeed positive.   
 As school choice continues to be analyzed for its impacts on student achievement, 
it is important to determine what type of environment would allow competition to most 
effectively operate. This paper is the first to confirm that the structure of a for-profit 
charter school can work to improve student outcomes above what nonprofit charter 
schools have been able to achieve.   
70 
Chapter 5 
The Effects of Vouchers on Student Achievement in Urban and Rural 
Districts:  Evidence from Cleveland, Ohio 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The overlapping goal of all types of school choice is to provide parents the opportunity to 
choose a school which offers a high quality education and produces competitive student 
outcomes.  When it comes to education reform, proponents of school choice claim that a 
free market in education would work to raise productivity in the public school sector.   
This argument rests on two claims.  First, it is often argued that private schools are more 
efficient than public schools.  School choice could therefore improve student outcomes 
by facilitating the transfer of students to the private sector.  The second argument for 
school choice says that without competition, public schools face weak incentives to 
improve.  Educational vouchers are a form of school choice that are defined as, 
“government grants aimed at improving education for the children of low-income 
families by providing school tuition that can be used at public or private schools.”79 It has 
been hypothesized by many economists that school vouchers would create an education 
market where competition from private schools would create incentives for public 
schools to be more innovative and provide a better education for their students as well as 
help to raise public school productivity.80   The first piece of evidence suggesting that 
public schools react to outside competition is demonstrated by Hoxby (1994) who finds 
that public schools in areas that have larger concentrations of private Catholic schools 
perform better than those facing less private competition.  More recently, Hanushek and 
                                                 
79 Education voucher, 2005. [Online] Available at URL http://www.answers.com.  
80 Milton Friedman is most referenced economist on this issue.   
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Rivkin (2003) have found that more competition tends to increase teacher quality.  This 
result is of great importance given that teacher quality is one of the primary determinants 
of school quality.   
Opponents of vouchers believe that school choice programs drain resources from 
public schools that are already in dire need of new buildings, more textbooks, higher 
teacher salaries, and so on.  Proponents contend that it is the school bureaucracies who 
are at fault for diverting resources from real educational activities and say that school 
choice would only work to redirect funding to where it belongs.  Opponents also contend 
that those who will take advantage of the voucher’s  and other school choice options will 
be the more advantaged  students leaving the disadvantaged students worse off in the 
long-run.  This idea of “cream-skimming” has been widely studied in the educational 
literature.  Howell and Peterson (2002) summarize evidence from three privately funded 
voucher programs in New York City, Dayton, Ohio and Washington D.C comparing 
families who accept and those who decline vouchers. In terms of the socio-demographic 
characteristics, the authors found that applicant families were more likely to be two 
parent households, have a slightly higher percentage of mothers who are college 
graduates, move less frequently, were more likely to be African American and less likely 
to be Hispanic, and were more likely to attend church at least once a week. There was 
also evidence that applicant families were more likely to be involved in schools using 
data on attendance at parent teacher conferences and volunteering in the school.  In terms 
of academic differences, the authors found that students who used a voucher to attend the 
lower elementary grades had slightly higher reading scores than those who did not use the 
voucher.  Overall, the authors found that the Dayton program sees modest, statistically 
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significant negative selection on math scores, the New York City and Washington D.C.  
programs see small, statistically insignificant positive selection in math scores for grades 
one through five, and finally for the D.C. program for grades six through eight, a 
statistically significant positive difference of 6.3 percentile points was found.  Howell and 
Peterson (2002) summarized their evidence on selection associated with school vouchers 
targeted to low-income populations by saying, “On the whole, these findings earn school 
vouchers a surprisingly positive grade on the selection line of the report card.” Howell 
and Peterson (2002) also studied the Cleveland voucher program and found no clear 
pattern of positive selection.   
In terms of other school choice options, Bulkley and Fisler (2002) briefly 
reviewed the evidence on the racial and socioeconomic composition of charter schools. 
The authors showed that the RPP International 2001 study found that the racial and ethnic 
composition of charter schools is similar to that of the school district. Additionally, they 
found little indication that charter schools lead to a large exodus of the most advantaged 
children from regular public schools. 
Although there are many studies that find parental satisfaction in terms of 
vouchers and charter schools, policymakers are most often focused only on test scores as 
a gauge for whether or not school choice is effective.81 Studies conducted to measure the 
effects of school choice on educational outcomes typically offer positive results.  Cullen 
et. al (2004) look at the Chicago Public School system and the effects of open enrollment 
and find no specific benefits using academic measures such as standardized test scores 
                                                 
81 Peterson, Paul E., William G. Howell, and Jay P. Greene, 1998. “An Evaluation of the Cleveland 




and attendance rates.  The authors do however find some evidence of improved outcome 
measures through lower disciplinary incidences and arrest rates.  Hoxby (2001) measures 
the effects of school choice on school productivity and finds gains in productivity when 
analyzing vouchers in Milwaukee, and charter schools in both Michigan and Arizona.  
Greene (2001) analyzes the effects of Florida’s voucher program and finds that after the 
first year, schools that were receiving a failing grade according to the state’s grading 
system and hence subject to the voucher system, raised achievement significantly more 
than comparable schools not subject to the threat of vouchers.   
Many authors who analyze the effects of school choice on student outcomes focus 
on a particular subset of students who participate in some form of school choice and 
compare them to students who choose to stay at their assigned public school. For 
example, Rouse (1998) studied the effects of vouchers through the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program and found that students in the program had faster math score gains but 
similar reading score gains when compared to students not in the program. Wolf et. al 
(2001) studied a privately funded voucher program in Washington D.C. and found that 
African American students who switched to private schools scored 9 national percentile 
rank points higher than their public school peers in combined math and reading 
achievement. After studying the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, Metcalf 
(1999) reported that “scholarship students in existing private schools had significantly 
higher test scores than public school students in language (45.0 versus 40.0) and science 
(40.0 versus 36.0). However, there were no statistically significant differences between 
these groups on any of the other scores.” 
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  The focus of this chapter is to analyze the effects of vouchers in terms of the 
competition that this type of school choice is predicted to create. Therefore, instead of 
analyzing the test scores of the students participating in the program, I examine the 
effects of school choice on the individual public schools in the region from which the 
students are leaving. Given that voucher programs have typically been implemented to 
help the plight of low performing urban schools, it is important to compare urban school 
district and rural school district student outcomes to see what differences or similarities 
arise between the two regions. More specifically, I analyze how the introduction of 
vouchers in the Greater Cleveland Area has impacted both urban and rural public school 
performance on proficiency tests in the subjects of citizenship, mathematics, reading, 
science, and writing.  My results indicate that the voucher program is having a positive 
effect on average test scores for the students who stay in the public schools for both the 
urban and rural areas in the Cleveland region with the urban schools seeing greater 
improvements in terms of the magnitude of the test scores.   
This chapter of the dissertation is set up as follows.  Section 5.2 presents the 
theoretical model for measuring student outcomes from which the empirical model is 
developed.  Section 5.3 describes the data and Section 5.4 estimates the model for the 
2002-03 and 2003-04 school years. Section 5.5 presents concluding thoughts and 
implications of this analysis.   
 
5.2 Theoretical Model 
Cleveland, Ohio presents a unique opportunity for conducting research on the effects of 
school choice on student outcomes.  In particular, Cleveland enacted a publicly funded 
75 
school voucher program in 1995 which today is one of only six such programs in the 
United States to use a fully funded system.82   The Cleveland program has grown from 
1,994 students in 1996–97 to 5,098 students attending over 50 religious and nonreligious 
private schools in 2003–04.83  Vouchers, or scholarships as they are sometimes called, are 
awarded by lottery and preference is given to families whose incomes fall below 200 
percent of the federal poverty level, which was $37,770 for a family of four in 2004.  
In order to analyze the effects of vouchers on student outcomes it is important to 
understand the theory behind measuring educational attainment.  A widely accepted 
approach to estimating educational outcomes is by measuring the effects of various levels 
and combinations of educational inputs on student outcomes through the use of the 
education production function.  The education production function determines the 
amount of output that results from a certain level of inputs. Typically the output of 
education is measured through achievement on standardized test scores or through the job 
market, measured by earnings. Extensive research has been done using a variety of 
educational inputs.  Some of the most common inputs to education include teacher 
characteristics such as highest degree earned, years of experience and teacher salaries. 
Another category of inputs include school characteristics such as expenditures per pupil, 
class size and student teacher ratio.  The final group of widely recognized school inputs 
can be referred to as socio-demographic characteristics which include specific student 
attributes such as innate ability, neighborhood effects, peer effects, and parent’s 
education and income.  The outcomes that have been reported from using these various 
input measures in the education production function have given rise to much controversy.  
                                                 
82 The other fully funded voucher programs are found in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and in cities throughout the 
state of Florida, Maine, and Vermont. 
83 Ohio Department of Education’s Office of Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program.   
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One of the earliest investigations of the link between school inputs and student outcomes 
was done by Coleman (1966) who found very little evidence of school resources having 
an impact on academic achievement.  Hanushek (1996) summarized more than 300 
studies that measured a variety of the above mentioned inputs and found that in general 
the results indicate that there is no strong systematic relationship between school 
expenditures and student performance.  Studies by Card and Krueger (1996) did find a 
positive relationship between expenditures per pupil and the student teacher ratio in 
earnings across a wide range of age groups.  Taylor (1999) and Pogue et al. (1999) 
control for family backgrounds and also find positive effects of additional resources as 
measured by student performance.      
 Even with mixed results the education function production continues to be the 
most preferred method of analyzing the relationship between inputs to education and the 
resulting outcomes.  Todd and Wolpin (2003) summarize a variety of modeling 
approaches used in the education production function literature.  As they point out, early 
studies such as Hanushek (1986) only used contemporaneous inputs while more recent 
studies use a value-added approach to alleviate the need for data on historical inputs and 
endowments.      
In order to test for the effects of vouchers on public school performance, I will 
adopt the value-added approach. This estimation technique has been used in the literature 
due to data limitations on input histories and in its most common form, relates an 
achievement outcome measure to school and family inputs and a lagged achievement 




Aijt = f (Aijt-1, Tijt, Sjt, Xjt)    (5.1) 
 
where Aijt is output and represents student achievement of each individual school, i, in a 
particular district j at time t.  The inputs are represented by a vector of teacher 
characteristics Tijt, a vector of school inputs, Sjt, and a vector of student attributes, 
neighborhood effects, and peer effects, Xjt. Aijt-1 represents the lagged achievement 
measure which in this case will be based on standardized test scores.      
 
5.3 Data 
The test score data for this study comes from the Ohio Department of Education and is 
based on a proficiency exam administered to students in the fourth grade for the 2003-04 
and 2002-03 school years.  The results of the exam are reported as the percentage of 
students who meet or exceed a proficiency level set by the state of Ohio.  Students are 
tested in citizenship, mathematics, reading, writing, and science.  This chapter’s focus is 
to analyze the effects of vouchers on public school performance, so I have chosen the 
Greater Cleveland Area for the study due to the fact that fully funded vouchers are 
currently only available in this region.  The Greater Cleveland Area is broken up into 12 
school systems or smaller districts with each school system containing a certain number 
of individual schools.  Table 5.1 lists the 12 school districts, and the number of individual 
schools within each school system.   
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Table 5.1 The 12 School Systems in the Greater Cleveland Area 
and the Associated Number of Schools 
 
Greater Cleveland School Districts 
 
Number of Schools 
Beachwood School System 5 




Cleveland Public Schools 130 
Diocese of Cleveland Office of Catholic Education 
 
91 
Independence Local Schools 
 
3 
Lakewood Schools 14 
Mentor Exempted Village School District 
 
16 
North Olmsted City Schools 
 
9 
Olmsted Falls City Schools 
 
4 
Orange City Schools 
 
3 
Shaker Heights City School District 
 
7 
Willoughby-Eastlake City Schools 
 
14 
Source:  Ohio Department of Education.   
 
For the empirical analysis, each of the 12 school systems are matched with other 
school systems or districts throughout the state based on a variety of characteristics such 
as average daily membership, percent of the population with administrative or 
professional occupations, median income, percent of the population with a college 
degree, population density, percent of non-residential and non-agricultural land per pupil 
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and percent minority students.  Tables A.7-A.10 in the Appendix display the matched 
districts and the data used in deriving comparable systems.84     
Data used for teacher characteristics also comes from the Ohio Department of 
Education which has developed categories such as the percent of teachers who are highly 
qualified, the percent of teacher’s who are fully certified, along with the normally 
reported categories such percent of teachers with a Master’s degree and years of 
experience.   
 
5.4 Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
For empirical purposes I follow the current literature and assume that the education 
production function is linear to generate a general regression equation, 
 
Aijt = α + φAijt-1 + γTijt + ρSjt + λXjt + εijt                                         (5.2)  
 
where Aijt represents achievement on the Ohio proficiency test measured by the 
percentage of students at or above the proficient level at school i, in district j, at time t, 
with Aijt-1 representing the lagged test score.  The vector of inputs measuring teacher 
characteristics in this study is based on a variety of teacher attributes such as years of 
experience and level of education which is used by the Ohio Department of Education to 
develop a measure for the percentage of teachers considered to be highly qualified to 
teach in each individual school.  The vector of school inputs, Sjt, and the vector of student 
attributes, neighborhood effects, and peer effects, Xjt used in the model are based on the 
                                                 
84 Only 4 districts contain enough data for an analysis, this point is made later in the paper as well.   
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categories used to match similar districts.  Therefore, the specific regression equation I 
use to test for the effects of vouchers on public school student achievement is as follows, 
 
Scoreijt = α + φScoreijt-1 + σVoucherijt + θMinorityjt + δEnrollmentjt  + λPopDenjt + 
γTeacherijt + εijt                                                                                                               (5.3) 
where Scoreijt  represents student achievement on a standardized proficiency test in 
citizenship, mathematics, reading, writing, and science, Scoreijt-1 is the lagged test score, 
Voucherijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the public school is located in the 
Cleveland area, Minorityjt is the percent of minority students in each district, Enrollment 
is the total number of students in each district, PopDenjt is the population density of the 
county for which the district is located, Teacherijt is the percentage of teachers highly 
qualified to teach and ε is the random error term.   
   Four of the 12 districts listed in Table 5.1 contained enough observations for a 
thorough analysis.  The Cleveland Municipal and Lakewood City School Districts 
represent the urban regions for the analysis and the Mentor Exempted Village and 
Willoughby-Eastlake School Districts represent the relatively rural regions.      
 The school districts were broken down into urban and rural regions based on 
population density with Cleveland Municipal and Lakewood City having densities of 
6,103 and 10,511 and Mentor Exempted Village and Willoughby-Eastlake having 
population densities of 1,800 and 2,147.  The schools used in the Cleveland Municipal 
and Lakewood City analysis also have a much higher percentage of minority students, 
higher poverty rates, and lower median incomes, all common characteristics of urbanized 
areas.   
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  Tables 5.2 and 5.3 represent the regression results for the urban school districts 
and comparable schools for students being tested in the fourth grade for the 2002-03 and 
2003-04 school years in the subjects of citizenship, mathematics, reading, science, and 
writing. Table 5.2 displays the results for the Cleveland Municipal School District and 
shows that in 2002-03 average student proficiency in the choice region is approximately 
11 percent higher for the subjects of citizenship and science when compared to the non- 
choice regions.  The results for the 2003-04, show that those schools who participate in 
the voucher program have average proficiency scores in mathematics, science, and 
writing that are approximately 14 percent higher when compared to the non voucher 
regions. Table 5.3 displays the regression results for the Lakewood City School District 
and comparable schools and shows that Lakewood City public schools on average were 
approximately 8 percent more proficient in science and 7 percent more proficient in 
writing for the 2002-03 school year when compared to non-voucher regions. In addition, 
Lakewood City public schools were 7 percent more proficient in reading for the 2003-04 
school year.   
 Tables 5.4 and 5.5 represent the regression results for the rural school districts and 
comparable schools.  Table 5.4 displays the results for the Mentor Exempted Village 
School District and shows that the voucher coefficient for science in the 2003-04 school 
year was positive and significant implying that students in the voucher region were on 
average 5 percent more proficient in this subject area.  Voucher was found to be 
insignificant in all other specifications for this school district. Table 5.5 displays the 
results for the Willoughby-Eastlake School District.  The voucher coefficient is again 
found to be positive and significant for both citizenship and science for the 2003-04 
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school year.  The coefficient estimates reveal that students were approximately 5 percent 
more proficient in citizenship and 6 percent more proficient in science.   
The above mentioned tables also display coefficient estimates for the control 
variables in the analysis.  Overall, percent minority is found to be negative and significant 
in a variety of regressions.   Enrollment tends to be insignificant for most cases, however, 
it is positive and significant in 9 regressions and negative and significant in 1 regression.   
Population density tends to be insignificant with only 1 positive and significant finding 
and 6 negative and significant cases. Teacher coefficients are also insignificant in most 
regressions with 4 negative and significant cases and 3 positive and significant cases.  
Table 5.6 displays the results of the pooled regression analysis.  The voucher 
coefficient is found to be positive and significant in all but 1 regression implying that 
overall, the voucher program has a positive impact on the public schools that face 
competition for students which this type of school choice creates.85 
In addition to the above analysis, additional regressions were run using an 
interaction term created by multiplying the variable Voucher by a new regressor called 








                                                 
85 Table A.11 in the Appendix pulls out the voucher coefficient from each regression in Tables 5.2-5.6 for 
comparison purposes. 
86 This number was chosen based on the highest population density between the two rural districts.  The 
population density in the Mentor Exempted Village School District is 1,800 and in the Willoughby Eastlake 
School District  the population density is 2,147.  Therefore 2,200 was chosen as the cutoff point for rural 
status.   
83 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6 Pooled Estimation Results, All Schools:  School Year 2002-03 and 2003-04 
 
 







2003-04   
Mathematics 
2002-03   
Mathematics 
2003-04   
Reading 
2002-03   
Reading  








2003-04   
















































































































































0.7641 0.7290 0.6994 0.7433 0.7106 0.7355 0.7507 0.5943 0.5555 
Obs 773 
 
773 775 781 773 773 772 772 773 773 
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Table 5.7 Pooled Estimation Results with Interaction Term:  School Years 2002-03 and 2003-04 
 




2003-04   
Mathematics 
2002-03   
Mathematics 
2003-04   
Reading 
2002-03   
Reading  








































































































































































































773 775 787 773 773 772 772 773 773 
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The new regression equations is as follows, 
 
Scoreijt = α + φScoreijt-1 + σVoucherijt + µRuralijt + θMinorityjt + ωRural*Voucherijt +    
δEnrollmentjt  + λPopDenjt + γTeacherijt + εijt                                                                                              (5.4)     
 
Equation 5.4 includes both a slope dummy and an intercept dummy.  The intercept will 
be α when Rural = 0 and will be (α+µ) when Rural = 1.  In addition, the slope of Score 
with respect to Voucher will be σ when Rural = 0 and Voucher = 1 and (σ+ω) when 
Rural = 1 and Voucher =1.  The results for the 2002-03 and 2003-04 school years are 
reported in Table 5.7. When analyzing the 2002-03 school year, it is shown that for the 
subjects of mathematics and reading, Rural is positive and significant implying that we 
could reject the null hypothesis of no difference in test scores due to location in regards to 
urban versus rural status holding constant the other variables in the equation.   In 
addition, the slope dummy, Rural*Voucher, is negative and significant for all subjects 
revealing that rural school districts experience less of an impact from the competition that 
the voucher system creates when compared to urban school districts.  The results for the 
2003-04 school year are uninteresting in that the variable of interest, Voucher, becomes 
insignificant in all but one case.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Finding a solution to improving the plight of low performing urban schools is an ongoing 
and highly controversial political issue.  The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 
(NCLB) is the most recent piece of legislation that has been implemented in an attempt to 
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improve educational outcomes in low performing schools.  This legislation, which 
promotes school choice in the form of open enrollment and vouchers was developed in 
part to create competition in the education market.  More specifically, this act addresses 
the idea that a universal voucher program would improve student achievement through 
the induced private school competition that would be created, forcing weaker public 
schools out of the market. In other words, creating choices for parents keeps only the 
high quality schools in business while failing schools are forced to either improve or 
leave the market altogether.  The results of this paper show that the urban public schools 
in the voucher region experience average proficiency scores that are higher for certain 
subjects when compared to average proficiency scores of public schools in non-voucher 
regions throughout the state.  This implies that the NCLB act, implemented to help failing 
low-income urban public schools, has been successful in creating competition for 
students which in turn has improved student outcomes.  Therefore, from a policy 
standpoint, this program is achieving its goal.   
 Smaller, rural schools are also seeing average test scores rise with the 
implementation of the voucher program within the region.  This result, although not a 
direct goal of the NCLB act, is a finding consistent with the belief that competition for 
students will create an atmosphere conducive to innovation in public schools leading to 
improved student outcomes. 
 The implementation of school choice throughout the United States has been 
growing substantially over the past decade.  It is important to analyze the effects of 
competition that school choice creates in terms of the educational outcomes of the 
students who are participating in a school choice program and in terms of the students 
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who stay behind in the public schools that are seeing the transfers occurring.  Whether or 
not these public schools improve after a school choice program is implemented gives us a 
way to measure the effects of competition in the education market.  Based on my results, 
both the urban and rural school districts have incentives to improve after a voucher 














Conclusion and Areas of Future Research 
 
 
Education reform in the United States has been and will continue to be a topic of debate 
for years to come.  Policies designed to improve student outcomes have been studied 
from an economic viewpoint for over a century.  Creating an education market for which 
competition can be implemented to improve public school quality has recently become 
the newest topic for debate among policymakers.  School choice is the most common 
term used to refer to programs that promote competition in education.  Choice comes in 
many forms, such as private schools, charter schools, vouchers, open enrollment, and tax 
credit and tax deduction programs.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
presenting specific applications of the effects of school choice on student achievement.   
These specific applications are contained in the four research chapters of this 
dissertation.  Chapter 2 measures the spillover benefits created by K-12 public education 
and analyzes how they impact market efficiency. Given the results from the empirical 
analysis, this chapter also examines how school choice would function in a market for K-
12 public education.  Chapter 3 provides a history of school choice in the United States 
and discusses how it has developed and changed the education market over the past two 
decades.  The next two chapters focus on specific forms of school choice and present 
empirical results on the effects of competition on student achievement levels for two 
different school choice options.  Chapter 4 compares for-profit and nonprofit charter 
schools and analyzes the interaction between the profit motive and the induced 
competition that is created by this form of school choice.  Chapter 5 examines how 
competition through the implementation of a public voucher program affects public 
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school performance by analyzing test scores of students who choose not to participate in 
the program in both urban and rural regions.   
The remainder of the current chapter will (i) summarize the major findings of 
chapters 2, 4, and 5, (ii) highlight the importance of each finding by relating it to the 
current literature, and (iii) propose topics of future research.87   
After Pigou published The Economics of Welfare (1920) almost everyone agreed 
that externalities create welfare losses unless appropriate taxes or subsidies are instituted 
to augment private behavior.  This idea started to change when Coase (1960) published 
“The Problem of Social Cost” and pointed out that externalities would create no welfare 
losses when transactions costs were low and property rights well-defined.  Coase also 
noted that government action is no more perfect than market outcomes, and therefore 
intervention might actually worsen the externality situation.  Buchanan and Stubblebine 
(1962) also point out that some externalities will be appropriately internalized privately 
and therefore will not impact market efficiency.  Chapter 2 focuses on the idea that the 
positive externalities created by education could be like those discussed by Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (1962) and therefore not Pareto-relevant.  Using a median voter demand 
curve model this chapter produces a measure to estimate the degree to which K-12 public 
education suffers from a positive externality problem.  The results indicate that K-12 
public education is almost entirely a pure private good creating no Pareto-relevant 
spillover benefits to the median voter.  This implies that arguments for additional 
government intervention in the provision of public education based on efficiency grounds 
are unfounded.   
                                                 
87 Chapter 3 deals with the history of school choice and has a concluding paragraph already summarizing 
its importance to the dissertation.   
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This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature in that no one has 
attempted to quantify the spillover benefits of K-12 public education.  These findings are 
also important for policymakers when looking at the impacts of school choice in the 
education market.  Based on the empirical results, market forces are capable of producing 
the efficient quantity of education given the current amount of subsidization already in 
place and thus school choice has the potential to increase the current quality of education 
through effective competition.   
  There are a few extensions of this line of research that may be worth 
investigating.  First, the finding that K-12 public education is almost entirely a private 
good leads one to believe that privatizing education could work from a policy standpoint.  
One issue that could be further examined is the distributional effects of such a system.  
Second, it would be interesting to apply these results to other countries’ reform policies.  
In particular, how would the conclusions of this paper change if we instead considered 
the effects of school choice in less developed or developing countries.  Clearly my 
findings suggest very strong implications for the ability of school choice to improve 
student outcomes. This issue needs to be further examined using empirical studies to 
convince policymakers of its importance.   
Chapter 4 analyzes the impacts of charter schools on student achievement.  In 
particular, this chapter looks at the structure of charter schools to determine whether or 
not the profit motive in education can work to improve student outcomes.  Charter 
schools are a fairly new phenomenon and therefore the literature has just recently begun 
to focus on the impacts that this type of school choice has on educational outcomes.  
Studies show that charter schools are having positive impacts in two ways.  First, 
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research has shown that charter students typically see gains in achievement after the first 
year of attendance.  Other lines of research focus on the competition that charter schools 
create for traditional public schools.  Studies here are limited, but there is evidence 
showing a positive impact for traditional public schools from charter school competition.   
This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature being the first to 
compare for-profit and nonprofit charter school student outcomes.  Applying the profit 
motive to education is a fairly new line of research that has invoked much controversy.  
The structure of for-profit and nonprofit charter schools is modeled by Hoxby (2003) 
where she finds that for-profit charter schools have greater incentives to improve school 
quality because of the distribution of the surplus.  I test her model and find that for-profit 
charter schools are seeing higher test scores in two different standardized exams and 
therefore confirm not only her findings, but also a basic principle of economics, 
“incentives matter.”   
Although this study focused on the state of Arizona due to data limitations, as 
time goes on, more and more states are seeing a larger number of for-profit charter 
schools develop.  Michigan and California are just a few of the states that allow for the 
development of for-profit charter schools in their charter school laws.  The analysis of 
this chapter could be extended to several other states and for extended time periods as the 
data becomes available.  Also, additional empirical work could focus on the spatial 
distribution of for-profit charter schools relative to nonprofit and traditional public 







From an economic viewpoint, it is very important to analyze the costs and 
benefits of all policies designed to improve student outcomes.  Chapter 5 analyzes how 
the introduction of vouchers affects both urban and rural public school performance.  
More specifically, this chapter analyzes how the competition from private schools created 
by voucher programs effects achievement levels for those students who stay behind in the 
public schools.   
The current literature typically focuses on the students who choose to participate 
in the voucher program and analyzes how their current scores compare to students who 
stay in the public school system.  More recent studies are starting to analyze how public 
schools react to the competition that voucher programs create.    The results of this 
chapter make an important contribution to the literature by making an urban versus rural 
comparison.  One of the main goals of a voucher program is to help improve the plight of 
low-performing schools, which tend to be found in relatively urbanized areas.  The 
results of this paper suggest that urban public schools are seeing positive impacts from 
the competition that voucher programs create.  In addition, rural public schools in the 
voucher region are also seeing gains in student achievement, but not in the same 
magnitude as the urban public schools in the study.  These findings give support to the 
notion that when voucher programs are implemented to help those schools most in need, 
the goal of improved student performance in these schools is achieved.    
Clearly, the debate over whether or not school choice can ultimately be the 
solution to our educational problems is still an issue that needs extensive work.   In order 
to accurately measure the benefits and costs of implementing competition into the 
education market, the theory of school choice will need to be further developed.  In 
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addition, further empirical studies measuring the impacts of school choice on student 
achievement will need to be undertaken and analyzed in great detail.  
Based on the current literature, and the results of this dissertation, the positive 
aspects of integrating competition into the education market are finally being realized. 
School choice has made great strides over the past 20 years, but in order for the benefits 
of choice to be fully realized, options must be made available on a broader scale.  Future 





































Buchanan and Stubblebine’s (1962) derivation of inframarginal externalities.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter it is important to understand how Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (1962) make the distinction between marginal and inframarginal 
externalities, potentially relevant and irrelevant externalities, and Pareto-relevant and 
Pareto irrelevant externalities.  The authors define an externality to exist when, 
 
uA = uA (X1, X2, ….,Xm, Y1). 
 
The above equation states that the utility of individual A depends upon the activities 
under her own control (X1, X2, ….,Xm) and the activity Y1 which is out of individual’s A 
control and by definition is under taken by individual B.  The next step is to assume that 
individual A will maximize utility taking Y1 into account and will modify the X’s as Y1 
changes to maintain a state of equilibrium.  Therefore, a marginal externality exists when, 
 
A
Yu 1  ≠ 0. 
 
The lower case u’s are employed here to represent the partial derivatives of the utility 
function.  In other words, AYu 1  = ∂ u
A / ∂Y1.  An inframarginal externality holds at those 
points where,  
 
A
Yu 1  = 0. 
 
These classifications can be broken down into economies and diseconomies with a 
marginal external economy existing when AYu 1  > 0 and a marginal external diseconomy 
when AYu 1  < 0.  An inframarginal external economy exists when for any set of values for 
(X1, X2, …., Xm), for example (C1, C2, ….,Cm),  
 
A






Yu  dY1 > 0. 
This is the condition relevant for this chapter which states that even though incremental 
changes in the extent of B’s activity have no affect on A’s utility, the total effect of B’s 
action has increased A’s utility.   
 
The next step is to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant externalities.  To simplify 
the analysis, assume that B’s utility function depends only on variables within her 
control, including Y1. B’s utility function will therefore be represented by, 
 
uB = uB (Y1, Y2, ….,Ym). 
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The necessary conditions for utility maximization by B are, 
B
Yu 1 / 
B
Yj
u  = BYf 1 /
B
Yj
f , where Yj represents B’s activity in consuming some numeraire 
commodity or service which is available by hypothesis on equal terms to A.  The right-
hand term represents the marginal rate of substitution in production or exchange faced by 
B.  B’s production function is represented by  
 
 
Bf  = Bf (Y1, Y2, ….,Ym), 
 
where both inputs and outputs are included as activities.  Therefore the right-hand side 
term represents the marginal cost of the activity Y1 to B.   
 
An externality is considered potentially relevant when the activity generates any desire on 
the part of the benefited party (A) to change the behavior of the party empowered to take 
the action (B) through persuasion, compromise, etc.  An externality that does not exert 
this kind of influence is defined as irrelevant.   
 
A relevant marginal externality exists when, 
 
A
Yu 1  │ 1Y  = 
*
1Y  ≠ 0, 
 
where *Y ’s are used to represent equilibrium values for the Y’s.   
 
When the above equation is greater than zero it is a potentially relevant marginal external 
economy and a diseconomy when less than zero. A is motivated by B’s actions to make 
some effort to modify this activity, that is, increase the resources devoted to the activity 
when the equation is positive.  
 
Inframarginal externalities are irrelevant for small changes in B’s activity, Y1.  However, 
when large changes are considered, A is motivated to change B’s behavior with respect to 
Y1 except for when,   
 
A
Yu 1  │ 1Y  = 
*
1Y  = 0, 
 
and uA (C1, C2, ….,Cm, *1Y ) ≥ u
A (C1, C2, ….,Cm, Y1) for all Y1 ≠ *1Y . 
 
When the above equation holds, A has reached an absolute maximum of utility with 
respect to changes in Y1, given any set of values for the X’s.  In all other cases where 
inframarginal external economies or diseconomies exist, A will have some desire to 
modify B’s activity.   
 
The above discussion describes the most relevant aspects of Buchanan and Stubblebine’s 
analysis of externalities for this chapter.  For additional discussion of Pareto-relevant and 




Table A.1 Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition Source
E state education expenditures A 
POP state population B 
INCOME state median disposable income C 
DEN state population density per square mile of land area C 
AGE state median age B 
NW percent of state population non-white C 
LESSTHAN18 percent of state population under 18 B 
SALARY average teacher salary in each state D, F 
SCHOOLS number of schools in each state E 
FREELUNCH percent of schools participating in the National School Lunch 
Program 
G, H 
F federal tax liability C 
G federal grants by state C 
 
Sources 
A:  State Government Finances.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  
B:  Census of Population.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  
C:  Statistical Abstract of the United States.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census. 
D:  Digest of Education Statistics.    U.S. Department of Education.   
E:  National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data.  U.S. Department of 
Education.     
F:  Estimates of School Statistics, National Education Association. 
G:  Food and Nutrition Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 







Table A.2 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement, 2002-03 
Dependent Variable:  Average Test Score on the Stanford 9 Exam 
 














































































































































































































Table A.3 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement, 2003-04 
Dependent Variable:  Average Test Score on the Stanford 9 Exam 
 















































































































































































































Table A.4 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement, 2002-03, 2003-04 
Dependent Variable:  Average Test Score on AIMS Exam 
 











Meet + Exceed 
2002-03 
 




















































































































































































































R-squared 0.42 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.42 0.50 
 
Obs 236 223  236 223 236 223 








Table A.5 Estimated Determinants of Student Achievement, 2002-03, 2003-04 
Dependent Variable:  Average Test Score on AIMS Exam 
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R-squared 0.62 0.61 0.45 0.68 0.57 0.64 
Observations 217 215 217 215 220 215 











average test score for each charter school from the Arizona’s 




percent of minority students in each charter school A 
Income per capita income by county B 
ForProfit legal entity of each charter school A 
BA percent of teachers in each charter school with a bachelor’s 
degree 
A 
MA percent of teachers in each charter school with a master’s 
degree 
A 
PHD percent of teachers in each charter school with a doctoral 
degree 
A 
< 3 Years 
Experience 
percent of teachers in each charter school with less than 




percent of teachers in each charter school with four to six 




percent of teachers in each charter school greater than ten 
years of experience 
A 
Sources 
A:  Arizona Department of Education, Directory of Arizona Charter Schools, School Report Cards, AIMS 
results and Stanford 9 results, 2000-03. 


















as % of 
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Cleveland City Cuyahoga 76,104 60.3 22.3 21,711 15.6 0.0 6,103.0 44,576 81.4 
Toledo City Lucas 39,066 47.9 25.1 25,316 22.8 0.2 3,574.0 30,695 56.0 
Dayton City Montgomery 23,594 51.4 25.4 23,217 20.6 0.1 3,857.0 41,962 73.1 
Akron City Summit 31,468 46.1 25.0 24,284 21.4 0.0 3,993.0 35,111 52.5 
Cincinnati City Hamilton 44,131 40.6 36.0 25,605 32.4 0.0 4,323.0 72,170 74.6 
Columbus City Franklin 65,222 37.4 31.6 25,701 29.6 0.2 4,029.0 73,851 65.8 
Canton City Stark 11,995 39.3 19.8 21,671 14.0 0.0 4,343.0 34,371 44.3 
Source:  Ohio Department of Education. 
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Barberton City Summit 4,348 29.1 19.8 24,687 14.6 0.1 4,265.0 35,343 15.3 
Cleveland Hts-Univ Hts City Cuyahoga 7,116 29.6 53.9 35,424 56.9 0.0 6,300.0 31,061 80.0 
Cuyahoga Falls City Summit 5,258 11.6 34.6 31,034 31.6 0.0 4,400.0 40,452 3.4 
Elyria City Lorain 8,279 26.0 23.9 27,045 20.6 0.4 2,178.0 51,535 30.5 
Euclid City Cuyahoga 6,324 29.6 30.6 28,193 25.3 0.0 4,932.0 49,622 68.2 
Garfield Heights City Cuyahoga 3,854 21.5 24.7 28,810 17.9 0.0 3,832.0 34,138 24.5 
Hamilton City Butler 9,483 33.3 22.3 26,316 16.2 0.4 3,806.0 31,423 17.1 
Kettering City Montgomery 7,590 4.2 39.2 32,249 38.8 0.0 2,660.0 72,756 5.7 
Lakewood City Cuyahoga 6,640 24.0 41.0 30,946 41.4 0.0 10,511.0 28,401 11.3 
Middletown City Butler 7,641 29.0 23.9 27,068 18.1 0.3 2,023.0 69,039 22.6 
Newark City Licking 6,957 31.1 24.0 25,188 20.8 0.6 1,767.0 34,797 8.0 
North Olmsted City Cuyahoga 4,536 11.8 37.6 34,162 34.0 0.0 2,939.0 62,064 4.8 
Parma City Cuyahoga 13,540 14.4 30.9 30,587 24.7 0.0 4,097.0 41,296 4.9 
South Euclid-Lyndhurst City Cuyahoga 4,489 10.7 42.7 35,064 43.7 0.0 4,076.0 42,522 41.1 
Springfield City Clark 9,783 41.3 24.0 23,086 17.3 0.0 3,575.0 25,135 32.6 
West Carrollton City Montgomery 3,919 15.1 30.8 30,102 26.6 0.1 2,994.0 49,301 12.5 
Fairfield City Butler 9,625 4.1 38.1 36,278 34.0 0.8 1,569.0 46,093 13.9 
Northwest Local Hamilton 10,623 10.6 32.5 33,386 29.7 0.6 1,756.0 36,563 22.0 
Washington Local Lucas 6,963 19.0 23.9 29,602 22.0 0.0 2,803.0 73,107 14.4 
Huber Heights City Montgomery 6,914 12.6 31.5 33,752 30.1 0.8 1,796.0 25,441 21.0 
Plain Local Stark 6,155 16.0 35.1 31,302 30.2 1.0 1,710.0 30,875 13.2 
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Mentor Ex Village Lake 9,673 5.2 35.8 34,749 33.6 0.7 1,800.0 60,113 2.1 
Kettering City Montgomery 7,590 4.2 39.2 32,249 38.8 0.0 2,660.0 72,756 5.7 
West Clermont Local Clermont 9,094 7.7 31.0 33,312 27.4 0.9 1,364.0 50,440 2.7 
Strongsville City Cuyahoga 7,284 0.6 42.2 42,554 43.6 0.1 1,758.0 56,640 5.2 
Cuyahoga Falls City Summit 5,258 11.6 34.6 31,034 31.6 0.0 4,400.0 40,452 3.4 
Willoughby-Eastlake City Lake 8,718 9.0 31.0 30,898 26.4 0.4 2,147.0 70,991 4.9 
North Olmsted City Cuyahoga 4,536 11.8 37.6 34,162 34.0 0.0 2,939.0 62,064 4.8 
Parma City Cuyahoga 13,540 14.4 30.9 30,587 24.7 0.0 4,097.0 41,296 4.9 
Stow-Munroe Falls City Summit 6,157 3.4 42.8 36,665 42.5 0.4 1,735.0 38,079 3.7 
Fairfield City Butler 9,625 4.1 38.1 36,278 34.0 0.8 1,569.0 46,093 13.9 
Milford Ex Village Clermont 6,189 4.9 38.9 36,763 38.3 0.7 1,122.0 33,295 2.9 
North Royalton City Cuyahoga 4,501 5.4 38.7 37,467 37.9 0.1 1,235.0 39,433 2.4 
Jackson Local Stark 5,626 1.6 43.1 36,968 42.5 1.9 970.0 78,517 3.5 
Oak Hills Local Hamilton 8,070 5.4 34.6 34,545 33.0 0.1 1,535.0 20,239 3.1 
Brunswick City Medina 7,211 4.6 31.3 36,543 27.4 1.5 1,454.0 23,934 3.1 
Medina City Medina 7,298 4.9 38.4 39,617 41.3 4.0 835.0 44,131 5.5 
Sylvania City Lucas 7,821 6.5 45.6 39,938 49.5 0.5 1,672.0 39,910 6.7 
North Canton City Stark 4,852 1.8 45.0 35,044 42.4 0.9 1,730.0 33,402 3.8 
Boardman Local Mahoning 4,891 11.0 34.3 29,444 30.0 0.6 1,591.0 74,321 9.2 
Green Local Summit 4,235 7.2 35.1 35,582 31.9 2.0 676.0 38,441 2.4 
Miamisburg City Montgomery 5,333 12.2 34.2 34,112 31.5 1.4 1,130.0 81,677 8.4 
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Willoughby-Eastlake City Lake 8,718 9.0 31.0 30,898 26.4 0.4 2,147.0 70,991 4.9 
West Clermont Local Clermont 9,094 7.7 31.0 33,312 27.4 0.9 1,364.0 50,440 2.7 
Boardman Local Mahoning 4,891 11.0 34.3 29,444 30.0 0.6 1,591.0 74,321 9.2 
North Olmsted City Cuyahoga 4,536 11.8 37.6 34,162 34.0 0.0 2,939.0 62,064 4.8 
Findlay City Hancock 6,049 14.4 30.1 29,016 31.2 1.1 1,086.0 52,611 9.6 
Miamisburg City Montgomery 5,333 12.2 34.2 34,112 31.5 1.4 1,130.0 81,677 8.4 
Perry Local Stark 4,809 10.0 26.2 30,142 19.6 1.6 1,223.0 46,240 6.1 
Mentor Ex Village Lake 9,673 5.2 35.8 34,749 33.6 0.7 1,800.0 60,113 2.1 
Washington Local Lucas 6,963 19.0 23.9 29,602 22.0 0.0 2,803.0 73,107 14.4 
Lancaster City Fairfield 6,117 16.8 25.3 26,820 20.7 3.3 846.0 52,804 2.3 
Kettering City Montgomery 7,590 4.2 39.2 32,249 38.8 0.0 2,660.0 72,756 5.7 
Troy City Miami 4,506 14.2 33.6 30,834 27.6 2.2 736.0 62,696 10.8 
Delaware City Delaware 4,449 12.9 36.9 33,837 32.4 1.4 765.0 55,478 8.5 
Berea City Cuyahoga 7,544 11.7 28.2 31,311 21.3 0.0 430.0 92,166 7.4 
Austintown Local Mahoning 5,138 12.8 26.4 29,375 22.5 1.0 1,502.0 37,051 9.9 
West Carrollton City Montgomery 3,919 15.1 30.8 30,102 26.6 0.1 2,994.0 49,301 12.5 
Howland Local Trumbull 3,309 14.3 34.4 32,227 28.0 1.4 1,373.0 82,619 7.4 
Oregon City Lucas 3,870 9.9 26.8 32,366 22.8 4.2 373.0 69,285 9.2 
Medina City Medina 7,298 4.9 38.4 39,617 41.3 4.0 835.0 44,131 5.5 
Fairfield City Butler 9,625 4.1 38.1 36,278 34.0 0.8 1,569.0 46,093 13.9 
Marysville Ex Village Union 4,775 9.6 27.4 37,938 22.3 13.1 181.0 69,231 2.6 





Table A.11 Voucher Estimation Results:  School Year 2002-03 and 2003-04 
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Urban School Districts      
 




















































Rural School Districts      
 





















































Pooled Estimation  
Results      





















Results with Interaction 
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Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses and the asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,  
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